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Abstract  
Title: The Impact of Income Smoothing on Firm Value after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Course: BUSN89, Degree Project in Corporate and Financial Management, Master level  
Authors: Bojana Cvetanovska and Bence Sándor Kerekes  
Supervisor: Göran Anderson 
Keywords: earnings management, accrual-based income smoothing, agency cost, 
information asymmetry, discretionary accruals, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Purpose: To empirically investigate whether income smoothing creates or destroys value 
after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has tremendously changed the legal 
environment of income smoothing. We compare our results with pre-SOX research to 
conclude whether and how legislation change has affected the perception of income 
smoothing. Further, we make recommendations based on our research how managers 
should approach income smoothing.  
Methodology: We use three income smoothing measures (𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴, 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂, 𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/
𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂) to detect managers’ actions to dampen the volatility of earnings. We regress them on 
stock return and as control variables we use the Fama French five factor model that explains 
stock returns. We control for industry, the 2008 financial crisis and earnings yield as well.  
Empirical foundation: We collect annual data from 2004-2012 for all US nonfinancial 
companies from the Standard & Poor’s capital IQ data base that do not have missing 
observations. Our balanced panel data consists of 1.882 companies and 13.174 firm-year 
observations.  
Conclusions:  Based on our results, income smoothing creates value in contrast with pre-SOX 
research. Our primary explanation is that SOX has changed the legal environment, in which 
managers are demotivated to act opportunistically. Investors regained their trust in financial 
reporting and do not consider managers’ actions delusive. This explanation induces 
managers to discontinue the application of real income smoothing and return to accrual-
based income smoothing. Another possible explanation is that the effect of income 
smoothing is determined by market uncertainty. Under high market uncertainty accrual-
based income smoothing garbles information and thus destroys firm value whereas under 
low market uncertainty it boosts firm value. Managers should refrain from accrual-based 
income smoothing if market uncertainty is high, but they ought to use accrual-based income 
smoothing if market uncertainty is low. At last, we note that the 2008 financial crisis does 
not influence the perception of income smoothing according to our results. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research trigger 
An interesting phenomenon in behavioral corporate finance that aroused our curiosity is the 
increase in price as a result of positive earnings surprises (Shefrin, 2007). In other words, if 
earnings are beyond what the market originally expected share price rises. That sounded 
surprising to us since we just learned from the Valuation text book (Koller, Goedhart, & 
Wessels, 2010) that it is the return on invested capital (ROIC) and the growth rate that 
determines firm value among others and not accounting earnings. We read several 
arguments why earnings do not truly capture a firm’s performance, however we have been 
taught that investors actually look at accounting earnings and make decisions based on that. 
But if so, an obvious consequence could be that managers just fool investors to give a rise to 
earnings as accounting makes it possible. But if managers want to delude investors it is a 
clear agency conflict; how does corporate governance deal with that? Corporate governance 
tries to align managers’ and investors’ interest through incentive schemes (Hart, 1995). The 
incentives are often based on earnings figures or the share price (Hall & Liebman, 1998). In 
either way managers are incentivized to tweak the numbers to increase earnings and 
through earnings to boost share price. This led us to the topic whether managers’ discretion 
on accounting figures increases or decreases shareholders’ wealth.  
By looking at the Enron case, shareholders seem to be easy to deceive as they have no 
unbiased insight in what is happening in the company. Top executives were playing with 
their own board of directors and investors while making hundreds of millions in a couple of 
years through tweaking accounting figures. Meanwhile the whole world was praising them 
to be the “most innovative company” in the US. How could corporate governance or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) let this happen? Why can managers just play with 
the numbers and make the whole world follow them? Corporate governance entrusts the 
board of directors to monitor managers and SEC investigates accounting fraud to prevent 
managers from such actions. Nevertheless, it is incredibly difficult to discern between 
managers’ earnest intention to do good for the company and their dishonorable attempts to 
expropriate wealth and power for themselves. They all pretend to be cherries but some are 
lemons. Or are some cherries and most of them lemons? In other words, is managing 
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earnings generally good or bad for investors? These questions induced us to investigate the 
topic of income smoothing. We have found that the US administration addressed Enron and 
other accounting scandals with the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which 
attempts to preclude detrimental actions against all stakeholders of companies. SOX tries to 
prevent managers from deluding shareholders, bondholders, companies’ own employees 
and of course the regulation. George W. Bush described SOX as: “the most far-reaching 
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.'' 
(Bumiller, 2002). Politicians tend to exaggerate though therefore we also want to shed light 
on the true effectiveness of SOX. Has SOX really been a remedy?  
In this paper we investigate whether managers’ discretion on managing earnings is value 
creating or on the contrary value detrimental. We empirically estimate whether accrual-
based income smoothing was value adding or value destructive between 2006 and 2012. We 
then compare our results with previous findings in the pre-SOX era and conclude that the 
perception of accrual-based income smoothing has changed over time.  
1.2 Background to the study 
Beidleman (1973, p. 653) defines income smoothing as: ‘‘an attempt on the part of the firm’s 
management to reduce abnormal variations in earnings to the extent allowed under sound 
accounting and management principles’’. Income smoothing is a legal right of the incumbent 
management to refine financial statements. 
Managers either use their discretion to alter earnings by different accounting choices or they 
change operations for the sake of earnings targets. For example, they may shift profit from 
one accounting period to the other or cut back advertising cost. The former case represents 
accrual-based income smoothing, whereas the latter is referred to as real income 
smoothing. The difference between them is that accrual-based income smoothing does not 
influence operations and thus does not influence firm value through operations while real 
income smoothing does. This paper focuses on accrual-based income smoothing later on 
since it is highly difficult to reveal real income smoothing (Gunny K. A., 2010) let alone 
determine the magnitude of its effects. Instead, the focus will be given to management’s 
discretion with respect to accounting choice within the framework of the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) in the United States (US). In the next paragraph, essential 
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definitions and the key concept of income smoothing are about to be explained to give an 
insight what it means in practice. 
Ronen & Yaari (2008, p. 371) explain accruals:  
“Accruals arise when there is a discrepancy between the timing of cash flows and the timing 
of the accounting recognition of the transaction”. Accruals are such items on the balance 
sheet that represent liabilities (e.g. Accounts Payable) or non-cash-based assets (e.g. 
Account Receivables) that are recorded on the balance sheet without actual payments being 
received or made. For example, when a firm buys materials to produce furniture the 
payment is not necessarily made immediately on the day of delivery, but within a certain 
period of time like 60 days. However, in the balance sheet the firm records this event by 
increasing inventory on the asset side and accounts payable on the liability side.  
Accruals can be divided into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. First, we provide 
definitions for nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals and then we demonstrate how 
companies use discretionary accruals to manage earnings.  
Definitions: 
“Nondiscretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions made in the current 
period that are normal for the firm given its performance level and business strategy, 
industry conventions, macro-economic events, and other economic factors” (Ronen & Yaari, 
2008, p. 372). 
“Discretionary accruals are accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting 
treatments chosen in order to manage earnings.” (Ronen & Yaari, 2008, p. 372). 
In contrast with nondiscretionary accruals, discretionary accruals are recorded based on 
subjective judgement. Management, of course, is not permitted to baselessly record events 
in the financial statements, but certain business events are difficult to absolutely regulate 
and therefore the regulation allows freedom for individuals to choose between alternatives 
that best represent the financial status of the company.  
Since managers can typically argue their accounting decisions they can use them as a way to 
delude shareholders, which is intuitively easily imaginable. Especially, since the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals that revealed that financial statements can be and sometimes are 
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manipulated to deceive investors. We, now, review the Enron scandal, which partly led us to 
investigate this topic in order to get the taste of how investors can be deceived by 
accounting manipulations. The following review is primarily based on the documentary by 
Gibney (2005). 
Enron was the first firm to trade with gas and electricity, which significantly changed the 
newly deregulated energy market at the beginning of the 1990s. The company was growing 
excessively to become the 7th largest company in the US employing 21.000 people in more 
than 40 countries (BBC, 2002). The share price of Enron increased by 337% between January 
1998 and August 2000. The company filed for bankruptcy a bit more than a year after it 
reached its peak share price in August 2000 (CNN, 2002). 
Enron changed accounting standards and began to use market-to-market accounting, which 
enabled the company to book earnings based on highly subjective judgement. They booked 
for example profits after signing a contract to sell electricity from a power plant in 10 years 
even though there was no guarantee that it was going to happen. Despite all the potential 
opportunistic accounting opportunities in Enron’s business, Arthur Andersen (Enron’s audit 
firm) and SEC both approved market-to-market accounting. Through this new treatment the 
company’s earnings skyrocketed to say the least.  
Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, had to make certain that the share price continuously rises 
even beyond analysts’ expectation. He, therefore, hid $30 billion of debt and losses via 
special purpose vehicles. His operations were overseen by Vinson and Elkins (Enron’s law 
firm), and Arthur Andersen as well. Merrill Lynch, Citibank and most of the prestigious 
investment banks were involved in financing Enron through special purpose vehicles and in 
some cases assisted Enron to hide debt from its balance sheet in the hope of farfetched 
returns that were impossible to generate legally.  
Top executives were rewarded with stock options for their services, which they all happened 
to exercise when it was most profitable. Just before the firm went bankrupt the major 
executives exercised their options in time to get out of the sinking ship. Jeffrey Skilling (COO, 
later CEO) was sentenced to jail for inside trading among others.  
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Arthur Andersen ordered its auditors to eliminate thousands of Enron related documents to 
obstruct the investigation (The New York Times, 2002). As these actions came to light Arthur 
Anderson, the oldest accounting firm in the US, fell with Enron. The company lost its 
reputation and reliability and closed its doors not long after Enron went bankrupt. 
Consequently 29.000 people lost their job.  
The scandals induced the US legislation to address the issue at short notice. Investors 
rightfully lost their trust not only in financial statements, but investment banks, accounting 
firms and law companies. As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was put into effect in 
2002. SOX was meant to protect investors from garbled information. The law has been 
punishing false reporting harsher, and making the Chief Financial Officers and Chief 
Executive Officers more responsible for what is stated in the company’s financial statements. 
The law obligated companies to establish stronger internal control. Financial statements had 
to include a report by an independent audit firm. In the next section, we present the 
purpose and the research question of the paper. 
1.3 Purpose and research question 
Cohen, Dey, & Lys (2008) find that earnings management changed due to the previously 
mentioned scandals and executives began to use substantially less accrual-based income 
smoothing after SOX was effective. The Graham et al. (2005) survey was conducted three 
years after SOX and the authors concluded that most managers were even willing to sacrifice 
economic value instead of altering accruals to meet earnings forecasts.  
In our report, we attempt to answer the fundamental question whether income smoothing 
creates value or it has just been managers’ false belief. We do not assume that income 
smoothing has either always been value-adding or has always been value-detrimental. Such 
scandals like the Enron case may have fundamentally changed how investors perceive 
income smoothing. Cohen et al. (2008) suggests that managers’ earnings management 
strategy shifted from accrual-based to real income smoothing after SOX, which is consistent 
with the findings of Graham et al. (2005) who conclude that the vast majority of managers 
(80%) would rather choose a real income smoothing decision instead of an accounting 
decision. Furthermore, more than three fourth would be willing to sacrifice economic value 
to meet an earnings target. We compare the effects of accrual-based income smoothing 
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before SOX based on the results of Rountree, Weston, & Allayannis (2008) and after SOX 
(based on our own results) to see whether managers duly reduce income smoothing and use 
real income smoothing or it is only a wrong belief.  
Rountree et al. (2008) conclude that income smoothing is value creating, but not due to 
managers’ accrual-based income smoothing endeavor, but due to decreased earnings 
volatility. Managers’ accounting manipulation is perceived value detrimental, but originally 
smoother earnings are priced with a premium. Thus, managers decreased firm value when 
engaged in earnings alternation via accruals, but increased firm value if they managed to 
smooth earnings otherwise. After SOX managers tended to substitute accrual-based income 
smoothing with real income smoothing (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008).  
If we find that income smoothing is value detrimental in the post-SOX period managers 
should not return to use discretionary accruals again. On the other hand, if income 
smoothing is found to increase stock returns managers should substitute their value 
destroying real income smoothing actions with accrual-based income smoothing. Should 
income smoothing be value detrimental investors ought to question financial statements. 
Income smoothing should then be considered suspicious, because managers would have no 
ground to argue that income smoothing is in the best interest of investors. Nevertheless, if 
income smoothing boosts stock returns investors should consider such managerial acts as 
business as usual. So, the main research question, is the following: How has accrual-based 
income smoothing affected firm value after the Sarbanes-Oxley act? 
Since all publicly traded companies have to disclose their financial statements, the research 
topic is highly relevant to decision makers, mostly financial principals, investors and 
legislators.  
1.4 Scope 
We investigate the effects of income smoothing on firm value in the United States of 
America exclusively. Therefore, our conclusions are only valid to companies that operate in 
the US and are listed on a US stock exchange. Especially since SOX applies to US public 
companies.  Financial companies have not been included in our sample due to their special 
accounting treatment, thus our conclusions on income smoothing are not applicable to them 
either.  
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1.5 Thesis outline  
The paper is divided into five chapters. In chapter two, previous research on how income 
smoothing influences firm value is explained. We show that income smoothing affects firm 
value via three channels i) agency cost, ii) information asymmetry and iii) externalities. 
Afterwards, in chapter three the sample selection is presented. Then we expand on our 
discretionary accrual estimation method and exhibit our three income smoothing measures. 
Further, our income smoothing measure is used to explain stock returns based on the Fama 
French five factor model. We describe our control variables and our hypotheses on their 
probable effect. In the fourth chapter, we, first, present our results how income smoothing 
affects firm value in the post-SOX era then we analyze our results and compare them with 
previous findings in the pre-SOX era. In the fifth chapter we summarize our paper and draw 
the conclusions.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) was a significant change in the legal framework in the 
United States. SOX is applicable for all publicly traded companies, private companies that 
prepare for an Initial Public Offering (IPO). The pre-SOX period was a time of financial crises 
that shed light on companies that engaged in pernicious earnings management. During an 
economic downfall, these events come to surface more often, or as John Kenneth Galbraith 
once remarked, “recessions catch what the auditors miss” (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Now, we 
present the most important changes that SOX resulted in:  
i. First, SOX regulates report certification by management. CEOs and CFOs are required 
to sign the financial statements of the company, whereby they can be hold personally 
accountable for the accuracy and reliability of the financial statements (Ronen & 
Yaari, 2008). 
ii. Second, it requires public firms to strengthen their internal control systems and to 
report material weaknesses (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Companies are obliged to hire an 
independent audit firm to review the accuracy of their financial report. The financial 
report is required to have a dedicated section for the accounting firm’s opinion on 
the accuracy and reliability of the report. 
iii. Third, SOX exacerbates the consequences individuals face if they violate SOX. Those, 
who impede the investigation process of US administration shall be fined and/or 
imprisoned for at most 20 years. CEOs and CFOs shall be fined up to $1 million and/or 
imprisoned up to 10 years if they certify non SOX compliant statements or they shall 
be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned up to 20 years if they deliberately acted so. 
SOX expresses this thus: “Whoever willfully certifies any statement as set forth in 
subsections (a) [CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORTS] and (b) [CONTENT] of this 
section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not 
comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more 
than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.’’ (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 2002, p. 806). 
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iv. Fourth, companies are obliged to report all off balance sheet items in their financial 
report.  
v. Fifth, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been vested more power to 
investigate fraud suspicious companies. SEC also looks randomly into companies and 
checks whether they comport with SOX and make their finding publicly available.  
According to research, SOX lead to a significant increase in audit fees paid by the 
companies. According to Eldridge & Kealey (2005) fees have increased by $2.3 million on 
average, and Asthana, Balsam & Kim (2009) show that the results of increase of audit 
fees are consistent with rent extraction on the part of the Big 4 audit firms. Raghunandan 
& Rama (2006) find that the mean (median) audit fees for fiscal year 2004 is 86% (128%) 
higher than the corresponding audit fees for fiscal year 2003. The costs associated with 
SOX were mostly covered by the companies, while the gains, increased informativeness, 
by the market. 
Lobo & Zhou (2006) and Koh, Matsumoto & Rajgopal (2008) observe a decline in earnings 
management in the period following SOX. The finding of Cohen, Dey & Lys (2008) is 
consistent with previous literature, but at the same time they argue that real income 
smoothing increased following the act. The SOX opened new horizons regarding earnings 
management research and raised questions with respect to the effects of earnings 
management and market reactions to earnings management. 
2.2 Income smoothing 
Income smoothing is an earnings management strategy. There are countless reasons why 
managers are engaged in income smoothing like for instance reaching bonus targets, protect 
their job, provide private information for outsiders or reduce tax obligations. The various 
articles that deal with accrual-based income smoothing attempt to point out the motivation 
of income smoothing through three channels as classified by Fields, Lys, & Vincent (2001). 
The authors partitioned the then available literature into three categories (i) agency cost, (ii) 
information asymmetry, and (iii) externalities affecting non-contracting parties. In the 
following part of the chapter, we are going to discuss each of the possible motives and their 
implicit or explicit effect on firm value.  
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2.3 Agency cost 
Since the separation of management and ownership firms face a so called agency problem. 
Managers (agents) are hired by owners (principals) to manage the company in the best 
interest of the owners. However, managers often find their own incentives and manage the 
company in their best interest instead. This is the root of corporate governance problem, 
which has long been established by previous researchers such as Adam Smith (1776) and 
Berle & Means (1932). Corporate governance has tried to align managers’ and owners’ 
interest through different incentives schemes. In the 1970s and 1980s, managers were 
incentivized to reach accounting earnings targets like earnings per share (EPS) or return on 
assets (ROA) to be remunerated (Fox, 1980). Later however, share options have become 
more popular as a way to reduce agency conflicts (Hall & Liebman, 1998).  
Agency conflict does not solely arise between managers and shareholders, but between 
other stakeholders as well. Equity holders can transfer wealth from bondholders through 
various activities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, bondholders started to restrict firms 
via covenants to mitigate the conflict, which has been deemed successful by researchers 
such as Smith & Warner (1979). 
Later on in this chapter, we are going to demonstrate how income smoothing relates to 
agency costs between managers and shareholders as well as shareholders and bondholders.  
2.3.1 Bonus Target 
Healy (1985) finds that managers tend to adjust accruals in order to maximize present and 
future bonus targets. He collects data from 1964-1980 for 94 large industrialized companies. 
Managers are remunerated based on a target figure like EPS. The higher EPS attained the 
higher remuneration managers are awarded until an upper threshold (bonus cap) is reached, 
which maximizes their pay-off. According to Healy (1985) managers decrease accruals if no 
present bonus increase is possible any longer and increase accruals to attain the bonus 
target. Healy’s paper is a cornerstone in the literature of earnings manipulation for bonus 
payments, however one has to be cautious due to Healy’s weak discretionary accrual 
estimation technique. Since the publication of Healy’s work, discretionary accrual estimation 
has improved substantially, nonetheless his conclusion that managers change earnings to 
obtain bonus payment still holds. Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan (1995) reviewed Healy’s work 
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and confirmed most of Healy’s finding by using a better discretionary accrual estimation 
technique (the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995)). They argue one of 
Healy’s claims though, which says that managers use discretionary accruals to lower their 
earnings when they can certainly not meet the earnings target. They suggest that it is 
induced by his weak estimation technique. Their advanced methodology indicates no such 
relationship whatsoever. One relatively severe problem in both of these papers is that their 
argumentation is based on a low number of observation. The Healy (1985) article uses only 
94 and altogether 1527 firm-year observations throughout 1930-1980 whereas the 
Holthausen et al. (1995) article uses 443 firm-year observations between 1982-1991. 
Furthermore, Holthausen et al. (1995) observe mainly manufacturing companies, which 
questions how applicable their finding is for other industries. 
Firms started to change cash based remuneration to option based remuneration (Hall & 
Liebman, 1998). Corporate governance literature argues that granting options to managers 
aligns managers and shareholders interest better (Hall & Liebman, 1998). This move changed 
the motivation for earnings management as well. Those managers that primarily receive the 
company’s stock options as bonus remuneration are incentivized to increase the share price 
and thereby benefit more from their options. Sloan (1996) finds that firms can inflate their 
current earnings through aggressive accrual estimates in order to raise at least temporarily 
their share price. Once the share price is up, managers exercise their options, which yield 
more than they would without managing earnings. In their research they use all available 
companies in the Compustat/CRSP database for a period of 30 years – 1962 to 1993. Their 
estimation of accruals uses the balance sheet approach, which has been proved wrong 
(Collins & Hribar, 2002). Their results are, therefore, biased. 
Bartov & Mohanram (2004) document similar results to Sloan (1996). They conclude that 
managers inflate earnings opportunistically to maximize their payout at the expense of 
future earnings. They question, thereby, the effectiveness of the cost reduction of option-
based bonus schemes. The inferences they make are based on a sample of 1.218 companies 
in the period between 1992 and 2001. They estimate total accruals by the Jones model 
(Jones, 1991), which has substantially improved since then.   
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Bergstresser & Philippon (2006) provide evidence that CEOs manipulate earnings through 
discretionary accruals more if their incentive package includes stock options or if their 
remuneration is tied to share price. The authors find that high accrual periods and unusually 
high option execution happen simultaneously. Their paper concludes that even though CEOs 
likely manipulate earnings to achieve private benefits it does not mean that they destroy 
value. However, since investors have to be cautious and observe managers’ activities more 
thoroughly not to be misled by them this finding seems to suggest increased agency costs. In 
their estimation they use the Dechow model (1995) that is an advanced version compared to 
the Jones model (1991). The base of their findings is solid due to their excessive sample size 
of 15.654 firm-year observations from the period between 1993 and 2000 and another 
sample of 40.517 observations from 1996 to 2001. 
Burns & Kedia (2006) conclude similarly to Bergstresser & Philippon (2006) that executives 
use aggressive accounting to achieve higher option remuneration. The more sensitive 
managers’ options are to share price the more probable managers engage in aggressive 
accounting. Their sample consists of 1.357 companies in the period between 1995 and 2001. 
They also find that stock option bonuses lead to misreporting the greater the convexity of 
CEO wealth. Thus, option targets are likely to increase agency costs as shareholders must 
remain cautious lest managers take earnings management one step further into 
misreporting and violating GAAP.  
As opposed to the abovementioned studies, Das, Hong, & Kim (2013) find that managers 
smooth earnings because bonus incentives encourage them to do accordingly. They argue 
that companies appreciate income smoothing and induce managers through such 
remuneration contracts. Nevertheless, their inferences may be biased due to the indirect 
measure of income smoothing (the volatility of cash flow from operations divided by the 
volatility of earnings).  
An investigation on the impact of SOX on the bonus remuneration of managers shows that 
there are noticeable differences in the pre- and post-SOX period. By reducing the flexibility 
in financial reporting SOX is supposed to decrease earnings management. This is expected to 
have an impact on bonus contracts by tying them more to changes in earnings, mostly 
because of the increased informativeness of earnings (Carter, Lynch, & Zechman, 2009). 
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Carter, Lynch, & Zechman (2009) investigate this and their results show that firms place 
significantly more weight on earnings’ changes while making bonus contracts after SOX. 
Carter, Lynch, & Zechman (2005) find that the relationship between bonus payments and 
nondiscretionary earnings increased significantly after SOX based on a sample of 1.180 
companies and 4.193 executives. The interpretation of their finding is that bonus 
remuneration became more tied to earnings since the act increased the trust in the reported 
numbers. Nonetheless, the premium on bonus remuneration associated with income 
increasing discretionary accruals still remains after the act. It is important to notice that the 
relationship between bonus remuneration and income decreasing discretionary accruals 
became significantly more negative. This means that bonus payments more correctly reflect 
the performance in the period.  
All in all, previous literature rather suggests that managers act opportunistically when 
engaging in income smoothing to obtain higher bonus remuneration before and after SOX. In 
order to reduce agency costs, firms have to monitor managers more thoroughly which is a 
costly process (Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008). 
2.3.2 Cost of capital 
Trueman & Titman (1988) were one of the first researchers who explained income 
smoothing as a tool to decrease cost of capital or more precisely cost of debt in their case. 
They suggest that managers may smooth earnings to lower creditors’ perception of the 
variance of the company’s underlying economic performance. Li & Richie (2009) find that 
income smoothing companies have lower bond yields and thus lower cost of debt. Their way 
of estimating total accruals by using the cash flow approach makes their research superior in 
comparison to previous ones (Collins & Hribar, 2002) and their model for estimating 
discretionary accruals following Kothari, Leone, & Wasley (2005) is the most powerful at that 
stage of research. They confirm Trueman & Titman’s conclusion and take it one step further 
by saying that income smoothing may be as important as liquidity in determining bond 
yields. 
Verdi (2005) examines how uncertainty affects cost of equity capital. Uncertainty consists of 
five parts in his model including earnings smoothness and he finds that even though 
uncertainty increases cost of equity capital earnings smoothness actually decreases 
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uncertainty. Thus, his paper contributes to the literature by suggesting that earnings 
smoothness reduces cost of equity capital.  
Chen (2013) finds that income smoothing decreases cost of equity capital alongside Verdi 
(2005). Her research on a 20 years period between 1988 and 2007 is based on a sample with 
55.499 observations. Chen addresses larger scope of income smoothing, including both 
measures for the total accruals smoothing and discretionary accruals smoothing. 
Nevertheless, she admits that not all of the implied equity cost models gives significant 
coefficients. She uses two income smoothing measures, but only the Gode & Mohanram 
(2003) implied cost of equity model returns significant coefficients for both of the measures. 
The Easley & O'Hara (2004) model returns a significant coefficient for one of the measures, 
while the other two models find income smoothing insignificant with regard to cost of equity 
capital.  
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper (2004) examine seven earnings attributes like earnings 
smoothness among others and conclude that smoother earnings are associated with higher 
cost of equity capital. Their results have a strong base of 3.917 firms in 27 years, from 1975 
to 2001. Nevertheless, their estimation of total accruals with the balance sheet approach 
should be treated with caution. 
At last, McInnis (2010) also investigates the effect of income smoothing with respect to cost 
of equity capital, but he finds that there is no relationship between the smoothness of 
earnings and the cost of equity capital whatsoever.  His research is based on 682.435 
observations throughout 30 years between 1975 and 2006. However, his income smoothing 
measure, volatility of net income divided by volatility of cash flow, does not measure income 
smoothing directly. 
2.3.3 Job protection 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1995) claim that managers boost their earnings in bad times to extend 
their tenure. In good times, information decay encourages them to lend money for future 
times. The information decay theory suggests that the current earnings possess more 
information about future earnings than earlier earnings figures. Thus, lending money to the 
future is advantageous because even if managers outdo themselves in the present it is not 
going to help them next year if future earnings figures are unsatisfactory.  
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Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu (2003) investigate whether bank managers use earnings 
management opportunistically to save their jobs. In their sample they include 91 banks and 
they gather data for the period between 1987 and 2000. They find that managers shift 
earnings from the future (borrow future earnings) when their firm underperforms below 
peers and postpone earnings (lend earnings) when their firm is expected to underperform 
peers in the future in order to protect their job. Specific to their research is that they don’t 
measure income smoothing directly, but they measure the specific conditions under which 
managers could engage in income smoothing. 
2.4 Information asymmetry 
Since market players have imperfect information, financial statement play a crucial role to 
mitigate information asymmetry. Income smoothing is, however, not necessarily reducing 
information asymmetry. Extant literature is divided based on this question. In the following 
paragraph, we present results that claim that earnings management garbles information. 
After that, we present evidence that actually earnings management provides information. 
Eventually, we provide information how it changed in response to SOX. 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, & Welker (2003) investigate earnings opacity in different countries 
including the US by using earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing as 
measures. Their earnings smoothing measure is the correlation between total accruals and 
cash flow, which does not directly measure the earnings smoothing effort. They limit their 
model to industrial firms exclusively, which mitigates the problem of cross country 
differences. However, their earnings smoothing measure may yield substantially different 
results due to dissimilar countries especially since there are regulation differences too. They 
use 58.653 firm year observations across countries. The large number of observations 
mitigates sample heterogeneity to a certain extent in their model. They find that income 
smoothing actually contributes to opacity, thus it increases information asymmetry. 
The authors measure earnings smoothing by the correlation of the change in accruals and 
change in cash flow from operations though, which does not point directly to earnings 
management. Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki (2003) claim that insiders manage earnings to mask 
the true performance of the firm, whereby they conceal their private control benefits. For 
instance, insiders may shift assets from the firm to one of their family members’ firm. Thus, 
Literature Review 20 
 
outsiders are exploited. If outsiders notice such events they will make actions to prevent 
this. Therefore, insiders try to conceal such activities to maintain private control benefits 
through earnings management. In this case, earning management increases information 
asymmetry. The authors measure earnings smoothing by the correlation of the change in 
accruals and change in cash flow from operations among others, which does not point 
directly to earnings management. They use a large sample of 8.616 companies across the 
period of 1990 – 1999. Jayaraman (2008) finds that the probability of informed trading is 
higher when earnings are smoother than cash flows and also when earnings are more 
volatile. When managers change earnings it becomes either more volatile or smoother than 
cash flows, but in both cases managers garble information because the probability of 
informed trading rises. 
Bandyopadhyay, Huang, & Wirjanto (2011) argues that income smoothing is value 
detrimental because it does not reduce, but increases information asymmetry if all effects 
are taken into account. Their results are robust to using many different measures of income 
smoothing such as: correlation between discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings, 
discretionary accruals volatility, earnings to cash flow volatility, total accruals volatility etc. 
They use a sample of all non-financial companies in the Compustat/CRSP data base, for the 
period between 1976 to 2007, that results in 355.166 observations. According to Yang & Zhu 
(2014) income smoothing increases informativeness and thus firm value under low market 
uncertainty. They measure market uncertainty by VIX index, which measures the volatility of 
S&P 500. The income smoothing measures they use are: correlation between accruals and 
cash flows and volatility of net income to volatility of operating cash flow.  Accruals are 
estimated in their model based on the cash flow approach, that leads to more precise results 
and they use a data set with 18.229 observations. They conclude that the ambiguity-averse 
investors tend to mistrust the information content of smoothed earnings under volatile 
market circumstances. These investors have then a propensity to think that income 
smoothing is a way to deceive them. Thus, income smoothing decreases shareholders’ 
wealth when the market is volatile.   
As opposed to the abovementioned researchers Sankar & Subramanyam (2001) conclude 
that managers can use income smoothing as a tool to reveal private information, however 
they emphasize the importance of institutional mechanism that restrict managers’ reporting 
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discretion. Zarowin (2002) and Tucker & Zarowin (2006) open a new chapter whether 
income smoothing garbles or provides information. Both papers conclude that income 
smoothing provides information as the current share price changes contain more 
information with regard to future returns when companies are more involved in income 
smoothing. Their results have a strong background since the measure of income smoothing 
they use, correlation between discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings directly 
captures the possible income smoothing. The estimation of total accruals is also done by the 
cash flow approach, that is considered more precise. Allayannis & Simko (2009) examine 
whether firms with different information environment are affected by income smoothing. 
They use the number of analysts following as a proxy for information environment. This 
means that the more analysts follow a firm the less information asymmetry there is. They 
claim that income smoothing is only value adding for firms with low or no analyst following.  
2.5 Externalities affecting non-contracting parties 
In 1986, the Tax Reform Act (TRA) became effective, whereby the US corporate tax rate was 
reduced from 46% to 34%. This change in legislation provided a great incentive for managers 
to minimize taxes. Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson (1992) find that the 812 firms in their sample 
saved on average approximately $0.5 million by deferring gross margin from one quarter to 
another. They differentiated between firms based on firm size and concluded that smaller 
firms are less opportunistic tax planners.  
Guenther (1994) investigated whether managers exploited potential tax savings during TRA. 
He separated total accruals into non-current and current accruals. Current accruals (e.g. AR, 
AP) affect taxable income whereas non-current accruals do not. He finds that large and lowly 
leveraged firms were more willing to have income decreasing accruals, whereby they 
benefited more from the lower tax rate. He notes that management-owned firms were not 
necessarily engaged more in income shifting despite his original expectation.  
Maydew (1997) observes how firms with net operating loss react to TRA and suggests that 
firms with a larger tax saving opportunity engaged more likely in income shifting, whilst 
highly levered firms had a lower propensity to shift income. He does not find any difference 
between small and large firms, which is inconsistent with the findings of Scholes et al. 
(1992). 
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Lopez, Regier, & Lee (1998) confirm previous research that firms shifted income prior to the 
reduced tax rate law to minimize tax expense, but opposes Scholes et al. (1992) along with 
Maydew (1997) that size is relevant in terms of propensity to income shifting.  
Lin, Lu, & Zhang (2012) examined how firms reacted to the New Enterprise Income Tax Law 
in 2007, which reduced the Chinese corporate tax rate from 33% to 25% and eventually 
came into effect in the following year, 2008. The authors found the Chinese companies did 
shift income to lower their tax expense as well as US companies shown in the 
abovementioned studies. They estimated the amount of tax deduction to be $646.1 million.  
All of the abovementioned studies resulted in tax savings, which definitely created value for 
companies. Nevertheless, one has to note that such opportunities are rare as the tax 
environment does not change every year in the US. Earnings management seems to be a 
useful tool to avoid taxes when regulation changes though.  
2.6 Income smoothing on firm value 
In the previous subchapters, it has been shown that income smoothing affects firm value 
through different channels such as agency cost, information asymmetry and externalities 
affecting third party. We now summarize what they concluded with regard to income 
smoothing on value and then present an article that directly measure the effect of income 
smoothing on firm value just like this paper. We are going to show their results.  
Extant literature concerning agency costs is divided. Some suggest that earnings 
management increases agency cost as shareholders must monitor managers more 
thoroughly, whereas others argue that agency costs, on the contrary, are reduced by 
smoother earnings via lower cost of capital for instance. SOX regulates financial reporting 
more strictly, which reduces the freedom of managers to smooth earnings opportunistically. 
Even though current literature does not conclude explicitly that agency costs are reduced 
managers are monitored more thoroughly by the authorities, which probably decreases 
agency costs. Previous research regarding information asymmetry is inconclusive as well. 
One part of researchers suggest that income smoothing garbles information and thus is 
value-detrimental, while others argue that it provides managers’ private information. 
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Externalities affecting third party seems to undoubtedly enhance firm value as researchers 
consistently prove that firms saved substantial tax expenses.  
Rountree, Weston, & Allayannis (2008) divided income smoothing into three parts  
Equation 1. Earnings variance breakdown 
𝜎𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
2 =  𝜎𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠
2 +  𝜎𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
2 + 2𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠) 
They try to explain firm value (proxied by Tobin’s Q) with all three measures and they 
conclude that lower cash flow and accrual volatility are associated with higher firm value 
whereas more negative correlation between cash flows and accruals yields lower firm value. 
In their model more income smoothing measures are used such as the previously mentioned 
correlation between total accruals and cash flow from operations (𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂) and earnings 
volatility per cash flow volatility (𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂).  Both measures yield the same result, 
namely, that income smoothing does not create, but destroy value.  
2.7 Hypothesis development 
Extant literature approaches the effect of income smoothing on firm value from different 
perspectives or channels as we discussed earlier in this chapter. Previous evidence of the 
effect of income smoothing varies between articles. To our knowledge, nobody has 
investigated yet how legislation change affected the perception of income smoothing. Our 
hypothesis is therefore the following: 
H0: Income smoothing increases stock returns as a result of SOX.  
In the next chapter, we are going to explain our methodology. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
We empirically investigate whether smoother income is associated with higher stock 
returns.  The time scope of the research is the period between 2006 and 2012. The starting 
period is 2006 since it took up to 2005 for all the rules to become effective. We developed 
the hypothesis following previous studies and we test it by using deductive approach.   
In order to conclude how income smoothing affected stock returns after the SOX act, we run 
a regression with the five factors of Fama & French (2015), earnings yield and industry 
dummy as control variables and our three different income smoothing measures, the 
correlation between pre-managed earnings (PME) and discretionary accruals (DA) 
(𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴) , the correlation between total accruals and cash flow from operations 
(𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂) and earnings volatility divided by the volatility of cash flow from operations 
(𝜎(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)/𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)). In the subsequent four subchapters, we are going to present i) the 
sample selection procedure, ii) how discretionary accruals are measured, iii) how income 
smoothing is detected and finally, iv) how the income smoothing measures are plugged into 
the regressions together with the Fama-French five factor model. 
3.2 Sample selection procedure 
The sample includes 1.882 US-based companies that had available annual information 
between 2004-2012 in the S&P Capital IQ data base. We use annual data due to previous 
evidence that firms smooth fiscal year earnings. Moreover, there are substantial differences 
in the reporting of the first three quarters and the fourth one (Das & Shroff (2002) Jacob & 
Jorgensen (2007)). That resulted in 13.174 firm-year observations in total. Since SOX was 
introduced in the USA and therefore only US based companies were selected in the sample. 
Financial companies were removed from the sample due to the specific legislation that they 
undergo. Eventually we obtained a balanced data set.  
3.3 Estimation technique 
The regressions are estimated with the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS), because it is 
the one most widely explored and hence, the inferences are most reliable. In order to make 
correct inferences based on the OLS method the following assumptions must hold: 
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Table 1. OLS Assumptions 
 
Any violation of these assumptions can lead to either biased or incorrect inferences. In order 
to ascertain the regressions fulfill these conditions, we run tests on the data set that are 
presented in the subchapter Reliability and validity. 
In order to come up with more precise inferences, we use a panel data set that consists of 
observations across both time and cross section. The panel data set is composed of cross-
sectional units that in our case are different companies and provide information about 
certain variables over time. 
According to Brooks (2008) panel data has the following advantages for researchers:  
i. First, a much wider range of issues can be mitigated, in contrast with either time 
series or cross-sectional data.  
ii. Second, the number of observations is increased. In order to examine how the 
relationship of certain variables develops over time, very long time series data is 
required, which is usually difficult to obtain. Further, Hsiao (2003, p. 3) explains the 
benefits of having more observations: “Panel data usually give the researcher a large 
number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables – hence improving the efficiency of 
econometric estimates.” 
iii. Third, panel data set can help in mitigating the potential omitted variable problem, 
which is a usual issue in regression specifications. The omitted variable problem can 
be dealt with employing one of the two classes of panel estimator approaches: the 
fixed or random effects model. By using these techniques, the effects of omitted 
variables can be captured by employing dummies in the cross-section and time 
period dimension that account for these effects. 
Number Notation Interpetation
1 E (ut) = 0 Zero mean
2 Var (ut) = Constant variance
3 Cov (ui, uj) = 0 Patterns in residuals
4 Cov (ut, xt) = 0 Non-exogeneous regressors
5 ut ~ N(0,     ) Normality of residuals
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The Hausman test for fixed/random effects is conducted to specify which technique is 
supposed to be applied to our models. 
3.4 Methods for estimating total accruals 
This paper differs from most of the previous literature due to its estimation of total accruals. 
Total accruals can be estimated by a balance-sheet or a cash flow approach. The balance 
sheet approach calculates total accruals by subtracting depreciation and amortization from 
working capital (WC), where total accruals are defined as: 
Total Accruals = ΔCurrent Assets - ΔCash – (ΔCurrent Liabilities – Current portion of 
long-term debt) – Depreciation and Amortization 
Whereas the cash flow approach computes total accruals (TA) by the variance of earnings 
before extraordinary items (EBXI) minus cash flow from operations.  
The balance sheet approach has been widely used in the literature (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney (1995), Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki (2003), Allayannis & Simko (2009), 
Bandyopadhyay, Huang, & Wirjanto (2011)). Nonetheless, Collins & Hribar (2002) argue that 
the balance-sheet approach overstates the amount of total accruals, and therefore 
inferences based on that model contain a serious measurement error. Hence, we use the 
cash flow approach following (Collins & Hribar, 2002) and other researchers (Tucker & 
Zarowin (2006), Rountree, Weston, & Allayannis (2008)). Note though that instead of 
earnings before extraordinary items we used net income as a proxy for earnings before 
extraordinary items. Extraordinary items such as natural catastrophes or accidents are 
assumed to be relatively rare, thus net income is a good proxy for it.  
3.5 Measuring discretionary accruals 
In this section, we present the development of the model for discretionary accrual 
measurement we decided to use. In the following subchapter, we expand on how to detect 
income smoothing.  
We, first, estimate discretionary accruals to measure income smoothing. Since discretionary 
accruals cannot be observed directly they need to be approximated. Previous literature 
(Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991) Dechow & Sloan (1991)) approaches the 
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problem by first estimating TA then decomposing TA into nondiscretionary and discretionary 
accruals. The significant improvement of discretionary accrual estimation are presented in 
the next subchapters beginning with the Jones model.  
3.5.1 The Jones Model 
The Jones model (1991) uses a regression model to approximate TA. The explanatory 
variables are sales and gross property and equipment. The residuals of the regression equal 
to the amount of discretionary accruals.  
The regression of the Jones Model is the following: 
Equation 2. The Jones Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + β2(𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡) + β3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + ∈𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total accruals, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total assets in year t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is change in sales 
and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is property, plant and equipment.  
The argumentation behind the independent variables is the following. Sales controls for the 
economic environment. The more a firm sells the higher accounts receivable it is going to 
have. In order to maintain higher sales, the inventory needs to increase to supply sales. If the 
inventory increases accounts payable has to rise as well. Gross property, plant and 
equipment controls for the nondiscretionary depreciation.  
3.5.2 The Modified Jones Model 
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995) compare the then available models (Healy, DeAngelo and 
Jones) and conclude that the best performing model was the Modified Jones model. Their 
model deals with the error that the Jones model produces when sales are managed or in 
other words when sales cannot be considered nondiscretionary. Their improvement is the 
adjustment of change in revenues with change in accounts receivable (ΔSALES – ΔAR). 
They suggest that the model suffers from misspecified variables since sales include a 
discretionary portion, and this effect is captured by the error term. The model assumes all 
credit sales to be discretionary and is eliminating that component from sales. By accounting 
only for ΔSALES – ΔAR, the model includes only the cash part of sales, which is considered 
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nondiscretionary. The discretionary part, AR is eliminated and is captured by the error term. 
The equation has the following specification: 
Equation 3.The Modified Jones Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + β2(𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  ) + β3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + ∈𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total accruals, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total assets in year t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is change in 
sales, 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is change in accounts receivable and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is property, plant and equipment. 
3.5.3 The Performance-Matched Modified Jones Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) use performance matched discretionary accruals measures to eliminate 
the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals. The idea is that firms with 
extreme performance (either poor or superior) engage more in income smoothing and by 
that possess a larger amount of discretionary accruals. Their research points out the need to 
control for performance. They use ROA as the measure of performance and estimate the 
following regression: 
Equation 4. The Performance Matched Modified Jones Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + β2(𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  ) + β3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + β4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) + ∈𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total accruals, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total assets in year t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is change in 
sales, 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is change in accounts receivable, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the return on assets and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is 
property, plant and equipment. 
3.5.4 The Jones Modified Forward Looking Model 
An extension of the Linear Modified Jones model is derived by Dechow, Richardson & Tuna 
(2003), which they refer to as the Jones Modified Forward Looking Model. The Jones 
Modified Forward Looking Model has higher explanatory power than its predecessors. The 
specification of the model is the following one: 
Equation 5. The Jones Modified Forward Looking Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + β2(1 + 𝑘)(𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) + β3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + β4(𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1) + 
β5(𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1) +  ∈𝑖𝑡 
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Where 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is total accruals, 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 is total assets in year t-1, 𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡  is change in 
sales, 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is change in accounts receivable, 𝑘 is the coefficient from the regression 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 
= α + 𝑘𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is property, plant and equipment, 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 is total accruals in 
year t-1 and  𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 is the growth of sales in year t+1.   
This model reclassifies items as discretionary or nondiscretionary to include only 
nondiscretionary variables in the regression. The more precisely variables are classified, the 
higher the explanatory power of the model is.  
The first adjustment includes only the unexpected portion of the change in accounts 
receivable for a given change in sales as a discretionary accruals. The k coefficient is 
estimated from the following regression: 
Equation 6. Estimation of k coefficient 
𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝑘𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑡 
The coefficient of sales k is the expected amount of change in accruals when sales change. 
Their second adjustment accounts for the portion of accruals that is predictable based on 
previous years’ accruals as nondiscretionary. Following Chambers (1999), a new variable, 
lagged total accruals ( 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1) is added that captures the predictable component. 
The third adjustment accounts for the growth of the company (𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1) since there is 
a misspecification in the Jones Model that should be corrected. Growing sales result in 
increased inventory to supply sales, which typically requires an increase in accounts payable. 
Thus, total accruals increase. 
3.5.5 The non-linear Modified Forward Looking Performance Adjusted Jones 
Model 
Measuring discretionary accruals is still a ‘hot’ topic in research since none of the 
abovementioned models are sufficiently accurate. The linear specification that underlies all 
of them as the relationship between cash flows and accruals cannot, actually, be linear 
according to Basu (1997). This finding is derived from the assumption that gains and losses 
are recognized differently due to the accounting conservativism principle that “anticipate[s] 
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no profits, but all losses” (Bliss, 1924). If bad news are recognized earlier than good news, 
the relationship of earnings and accruals is clearly not linear since the timeliness of earnings 
is asymmetrical (Schroff, Venkataraman, & Zhang, 2013). Following the conservativism 
principle of accounting, companies would accrue for unfavorable events in a timelier manner 
than for favorable events. Ball & Shivakumar (2006) argue that the linear discretionary 
accrual models are misspecified and they propose a piecewise linear function to mitigate this 
problem. Their model has the following specification: 
Equation 7 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1X+ β2(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) + β3(𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) +  β4(𝑉𝐴𝑅 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) + ∈𝑖𝑡 
where X is a vector of independent variables suggested to be determinants of 
nondiscretionary accruals, VAR is a proxy for economic gain or loss and DVAR is a dummy 
variable that accounts whether the company is experiencing gain or loss. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006) mention four variables that can be used as proxies for economic 
gains and losses. The four proxies are cash flows from operations, change in cash flows from 
operations, industry-adjusted cash flows from operations, and abnormal returns.  
This non-linear model is tested by Wan (2013) and is proven to have superior explanatory 
power over linear models.  
In this paper, the Modified Forward Looking Jones model is applied with a crucial adjustment 
for the linearity assumption that significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. 
We further include a performance measure following Kothari, Leone & Wasley (2005). The 
specification of our model is the following: 
Equation 8. The non-linear Modified Forward Looking Performance Adjusted Jones Model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  α +  β1(1/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1) + β2(1 + 𝑘)(𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) + β3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡) + β4(𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡−1) + 
β5(𝐺𝑅_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1) + β6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) + β7(𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) + β8(𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) +  β9(𝑉𝐴𝑅 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)  +  ∈𝑖𝑡 
Wan’s (2013) proxy for economic gain or loss is abnormal return, that is calculated as the 
difference between the actual return and the expected return. The expected return is the 
return estimated with the CAPM model. The return is natural logarithm from the stock price 
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and this measure is accounting not for the book, but for the market value of the company. 
This measure is more efficient because it incorporates more information than the financial 
statements which present only the book value. Nevertheless, the “non-book” value that is 
captured by using this measure contains information about items that only have market 
value, but these items cannot generate accrued gains or losses (Wan, 2013). Therefore, this 
proxy would measure the gains/losses with error therefore we include operating cash flow 
as a proxy instead. 
The nondiscretionary accruals are assumed to be the fitted values of Equation 8. 
Discretionary accruals are the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals: 
Equation 9. Estimation of discretionary accruals 
Discretionary Accruals = Total Accruals – Nondiscretionary Accruals 
3.6 The detection of income smoothing 
We employ three measures of income smoothing i) correlation between pre-managed 
earnings and discretionary accruals (𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴), ii) correlation between total accruals and 
cash flow from operations(𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂) and iii) earnings volatility and cash flow volatility 
(𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂). In this section we are going to explain how they measure income 
smoothing.  
𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 
In the previous subchapter, we discussed the computation of discretionary accruals. Now we 
present how pre-managed earnings are calculated. 
Equation 10 – Calculation of pre-managed earnings 
Pre-managed earnings = Net Income – Discretionary Accruals 
After calculating pre-managed earnings we compute the correlation between PME and 
discretionary accruals for each company using 7 observations (2006-2012). The more 
negative 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 the more the firm smoothes its earnings. The advantage of 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 over 
other measures is that it directly examines the income smoothing effort while other 
measures do not (Bandyopadhyay, Huang, & Wirjanto, 2011). This made 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 more 
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attractive to researchers and it has widely been used in the literature of accrual based 
earnings management (Tucker & Zarowin (2006), Bandyopadhyay, Huang, & Wirjanto (2011), 
Chen (2013). We consider this measure to be our most reliable.  
𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 
Total accruals and cash flow from operation follow a similar logic. If the firm has more 
accruals it means that more transactions are made without any payments actually being 
made or received. If TACC is high cash inflows and outflows did not happen. Whenever 
customers clear payments cash flow increases and TACC decreases. Thus, similarly to 
𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴  the more negative 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂  is the more income smoothing takes place 
theoretically. However, this approach does not directly observe managers’ deliberate action 
since it does not separate between discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals.  
𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂 
Earnings are less volatile if more income smoothing takes place, because accounting 
smoothes the fluctuation that originally derives from the nature of business. If firms used 
cash-based accounting transactions would be recorded upon cash inflows and outflows, 
which would result in much more volatile earnings. Cash based accounting does not contain 
as much information about the true condition of the company as it only records past events. 
The problem with this measure is that it can also reflect the economic cycle or some 
industry/firm specific effect and does not observe managers’ income smoothing action 
directly either just like 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂. This measure is also widely used by other researchers 
such as Allayannis & Simko (2009) and Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki (2003). 
3.7 Measurement method of the effects of income smoothing 
We use stock returns to estimate whether income smoothing is value adding. Each 
regression consists of one of the income smoothing measures (𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 , 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂, 
𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂), the Fama & French (2015) five factors, earnings yield and an industry 
dummy variable. The equations are presented below. The only difference between them is 
the income smoothing measure. If the income smoothing measures yield significant negative 
coefficients then the hypothesis that income smoothing creates value as a result of the SOX 
is not rejected.  
Methodology 33 
 
Equation 11 – Stock return predicted by 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1  = α𝑖,𝑡 + γ1𝑖,𝑡β𝑖,𝑡  + γ2𝑖,𝑡ln (𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡)  + γ3𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + γ4𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐺𝑃_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  )  +
γ5𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡)+ γ6𝑖,𝑡(EY𝑖,𝑡) +  γ7𝑖,𝑡(INDUSTRY𝑖,𝑡) +  γ8𝑖,𝑡(𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴)𝑖,𝑡   + ν𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 12 - Stock return predicted by 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1  = α𝑖,𝑡 + γ1𝑖,𝑡β𝑖,𝑡  + γ2𝑖,𝑡ln (𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡)  + γ3𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + γ4𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐺𝑃_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  )  +
γ5𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) +  γ6𝑖,𝑡(EY𝑖,𝑡) +  γ7𝑖,𝑡(INDUSTRY𝑖,𝑡) +  γ8𝑖,𝑡(𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡   +
 ν𝑖,𝑡 
Equation 13 - Stock return predicted by 𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1  = α𝑖,𝑡 + γ1𝑖,𝑡β𝑖,𝑡  + γ2𝑖,𝑡ln (𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡)  + γ3𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡) + γ4𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐺𝑃_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  )  +
γ5𝑖,𝑡ln (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡) +  γ6𝑖,𝑡(EY𝑖,𝑡) +  γ7𝑖,𝑡(INDUSTRY𝑖,𝑡) +
 γ8𝑖,𝑡(𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑖,𝑡   +  ν𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the stock return (ln (
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
)) , β𝑖,𝑡 is the 5-year stock beta, 𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is lagged 
market equity, 𝐵𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is book-to-market equity, 𝐺𝑃_𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡   is gross profit to assets, 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is lagged growth in assets, EY𝑖,𝑡 is earnings yield, INDUSTRY𝑖,𝑡. In the 
following paragraphs, the control variables are going to be explained in detail. 
3.7.1 The Fama and French five factor model 
The contribution of Fama and French in the literature regarding explanation of stock returns 
continues to have distinguished attention for their latest improvements. In order to increase 
the explanatory power of the models, their most recent research adds two variables in 
addition to the three factor model that are strongly correlated with stock returns. This paper 
uses five variables that are suggested to be the strongest determinants of stock return. 
Beta 
Their first variable is beta (β), which is a widely used measure of risk. Beta is a measure of 
risk arising from exposure to general market movements. Beta measures the movement of a 
stock in comparison to the market movement (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). Stocks 
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with higher betas would have excess return over stocks with low values of beta (Koller, 
Goedhart, & Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and managing the value of companies, 2010).  
Expectation: Beta is positively correlated with stock return 
Size 
The second variable in our model is size. Measure of size that is often used is the market 
capitalization, which is computed by multiplying the shares outstanding with their current 
price. The historical evidence on the effect of size goes back to the research of Banz (1981), 
which postulates that size explains stock returns. Fama & French (1992) publish results in 
line with Banz (1981) in terms of the strong explanatory power of size on stock returns. The 
negative relationship between size and returns can be explained with the theory of efficient 
market, as well. That is to say, the stocks with lower market caps are associated with higher 
returns because of the higher level of risk that they have (Shefrin, 2007). Theories that 
oppose market efficiency, such as the behavioristic one, would explain this phenomenon by 
mispricing of the stocks of companies with low market cap (Shefrin, 2007).  
However, a strong debate evolved about the effect of size after the publication of Dijk’s 
findings (2011). Dijk (2011) opposes previous literature by conducting a review of 30 years 
long research (among others Banz (1981) and Fama & French (1992)) and suggests that the 
effect of size on expected stock returns is insignificant. 
Fama & French (2012) publish new findings in response to Dijk supporting the power of size 
to explain stock returns. Most recent research in this area is trying to explain size with 
different factors that may have an impact such as dividend yield Moor & Sercu (2013), but 
their research is yet to present statistically significant outcomes. We include size in our 
model, because we have a lack of research on the variables that explain the effect of size 
and excluding this variable can lead to omitted variable problem.  
Expectation: Size is negatively correlated with stock return 
Book to Market ratio 
The third variable in our model is book-to-market ratio, which has widely proven to have 
strong explanatory power on stock returns. Fama & French (1992) include it in their three 
factor model. The intuition behind this variable is that value stocks (ones that have high 
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book to market value) tend to outperform growth stocks (low book to market value). This 
again can be explained with the theory of efficient markets, according to with high book to 
market companies have higher return and hence higher risk (Shefrin, 2007). Opposing 
theories explain this phenomena by market mispricing (Shefrin, 2007). The latest research 
admits the ability of book to market to explain stock returns (Bali, Cakici & Fabozzi (2013), 
Garcia, Mantilla-Garcia & Martellini (2014) etc.) 
Expectation: Book to Market ratio is positively correlated with stock return 
Gross profit to assets  
The following variables GPA (gross profit to assets) and AG (asset growth) are measures of 
profitability and investments, respectively. These are the variables that Fama and French use 
in their 2015 research in addition to beta, book to market ration and size. They started 
exploring the explanatory power of these two variables in their earlier research (Fama & 
French (2006)). This paper uses the following valuation equation as a basis to explore a set of 
relationships between future stock returns, current book to market ratio, firm-level 
expected profitability and firm-level expected investment: 
Equation 14. Relationship between stock returns, book-to-market ratio, profitability and 
investment. 
𝑀𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=  
∑ 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝑖 −  𝑑𝐵𝑡+𝑖)/(1 + 𝑟)
𝑡∞
𝑡=1
𝐵𝑡
 
 
Where 𝑀𝑡 is the market value per share, 𝐵𝑡 is the book equity per share, 𝑌𝑡+𝑖 is equity 
earnings per share, 𝑑𝐵𝑡+𝑖 is the change in book equity per share and 𝑟 is the discount rate. 
The challenge of the 2006 paper is to find relevant measures for profitability and 
investments that are related to return and negatively related to the existing variables in the 
model – beta, book-to-market and profitability.  
Novy-Marx (2013) presents findings that indicates GPA (gross profit to assets) as a variable 
that is strongly correlated to stock return, and these findings are the basis for Fama and 
French to include this variable in their model. GPA as a measure of profitability is based on 
the intuition that companies with higher gross profits, offer higher stock returns. 
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Expectation: Gross profit to assets is positively correlated with stock return 
Asset growth 
The results presented by Fama & French (2006) were, nevertheless, flawed in terms of 
proving the explanatory power of investments on stock returns. They failed to find the 
strong negative relation they predicted and that left place for further research on this topic. 
The negative relation between investments and return is based on the hypothesis that 
investors underreact the empire building implications of increased investment expenditures 
(Titman, Wei, & Xie (2004)). This relation was previously proven negative by Titman, Wei, & 
Xie (2004), so it was clear that the model is wrongly specified in some aspect.  
Aharoni, Grundy & Zeng (2013) reinvestigate this model and their results suggest that Fama 
& French (2006) model is leading to wrong inferences since they examined per share 
measures of expected investment and expected profitability while the valuation formula 
does not hold in per share analysis. A common measure of investment is for example, asset 
growth which if examined as per share asset growth can mislead because of events such as 
share issuance or share buyback. This error can be substantial to the degree that the model 
is leading to wrong positive or negative sign in the model. 
Fama & French (2015) acknowledge these findings and include the measures on a firm-level 
instead on a share level. 
Expectation: Investment is negatively correlated with stock return 
3.7.2 Other control variables 
Earnings Yield 
Earnings yield is computed as earnings to market capitalization. This variable explains stock 
returns in addition to the Fama and French`s set of variables. The explanatory power of 
earning yield on stock return is documented in Haugen & Baker (1996). Bandyopadhyay, 
Huang & Wirjanto (2011) include this variable in the return regression together with the 
measure of income smoothing and it increases the model’s explanatory power. Hence, we 
also include it in our model. The rationale behind this variable is that companies with higher 
profitability yield higher returns. 
Expectation: Earnings yield is positively correlated with stock return 
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Industry Dummy 
The differences between stock returns of companies across industries have been 
documented widely in the literature (Biddle & Seow (1991), Waring (1996), Hameed & Mian 
(2014)). Since we include the companies from all industries in the S&P Capital IQ data base in 
our sample expect from the financial industry that have many different characteristics that 
might be explained with other variables, there is a large possibility to have omitted variable 
bias. Therefore, we include a dummy variable that accounts for the industry effect on stock 
returns. 
Expectation: Industry dummy is correlated with stock return 
Crisis Dummy 
The financial crisis (2008) may have a significant effect on income smoothing and 
investors’ perception on financial statement in general. Therefore, we include a dummy 
variable to ascertain that this does not drive our results.  
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4. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Reliability and validity 
In order to get the desired results, as already described, four regression were run. The first 
one estimates discretionary accrual, which is a variable in our income smoothing measure. 
The remaining three regression estimate the impact of income smoothing on firm value 
using different income smoothing measures. All regressions were run on panel data set with 
13.174 observations. To prove the reliability and validity of the results we present the tests 
that were performed on the regressions. 
4.1.1 Discretionary accruals regression 
Normality 
To test for the normal distribution of residuals, the 𝑋2 statistic from the Jarque-Bera 
normality test was obtained. The results from the Jarque-Bera test show rejection of the null 
hypothesis of normality with probability of 0,00, therefore the distribution of residuals is 
non-normal. The results for the discretionary accruals regression are presented in Appendix 
C. Following the recommendation of Brooks (2008), a decision to stick to the OLS 
specification is made, since its behavior has been well research in a variety of circumstances. 
He also suggests that if the sample size is sufficiently large, the violation of the normality 
assumption will not cause any severe consequences. 
Autocorrelation 
For the assumption of zero covariance between the error terms over time to hold, the error 
terms need to be uncorrelated with each other (Brooks, 2008). To examine the 
autocorrelation between the error terms in the regression, we looked at the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Since the statistic presents a value of 1,89, which is close to 2 we conclude that the 
H0 is not rejected. It means that there is no strong evidence that there is autocorrelation in 
the data. The result is exhibited in Appendix B. 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an issue that is faced when the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated with each other. To examine whether the variables used in the regressions suffer 
from multicollinearity, we construct a matrix of correlations between the individual variables 
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(Brooks, 2008). The rule of thumb for correlation being a serious problem is correlation that 
is larger than 0,8. Looking at our results presented in Appendix D the correlations range from 
-0,14 to 0,07. Hence, we conclude that no multicollinearity is present in the data set. 
Heteroscedasticity 
To make sure that the variance of the errors in our data set is constant or homoscedastic, we 
look at the graphs of the residuals from the regressions. The graph shown in Appendix E 
visually presents that the variance of the residuals is not constant. Hence, we find evidence 
of heteroscedasticity in our sample. To mitigate this problem, we choose to use the robust 
standard errors (Brooks, 2008) (Appendix F).  
Heterogeneity 
One potential drawback of using large sample of data, in our case many companies from 
different industries and time periods, is increasing the chances of having heterogeneity. This 
is caused by the specific differences between the cross-sectional and time units that are not 
captured by the model. Therefore, these differences cause the explanatory variables to be 
correlated with the non-constant terms. The heterogeneity issue can be mitigated by 
introducing dummy variables in cross-sectional and period dimension that will capture the 
specific effect caused by the differences between cross-sectional units and periods.  
To the test whether heterogeneity is present in the data set, dummies are introduced in 
both dimensions and are tested jointly for significance. The results for the discretionary 
accruals regression are presented in Appendix G. The results from the “Redundant Fixed 
Effects”, both the F-statistic and the Likelihood ratio X2, indicate the presence of 
heterogeneity in both dimensions (Appendix H).  
The next step after detecting heterogeneity is to specify whether fixed or random effects are 
more appropriate for our regressions. This is achieved by conducting the Hausman test that 
has the H0 of well specified random effects.  
The results presented in Appendix I show that in the cross-section dimension the random 
effects can be used. The Hausman test could not be run in period dimension due to lack of 
observations. Wooldridge (2012) presents that: 
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“In practice, a failure to reject [Ho] means either that random and fixed effect estimates are 
sufficiently close, so that it does not matter which is used, or the sampling variation is so 
large in the fixed effect estimates that one cannot conclude practically significant differences 
are statistically significant” (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 496). 
Therefore, we decide to use fixed effects in the period dimension. The regression with cross-
section random and period fixed effects is presented in Appendix J. 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity arises when the error term and the dependent variable is correlated with each 
other. It leads to biased coefficient and thus unreliable inferences. Endogeneity can derive 
from simultaneity, omitted variables or measurement error. With regard to total accrual 
estimation simultaneity does not seem to cause problems as it is hard to perceive why total 
accruals would be codetermined with the other variables. Omitted variables may be present 
in our model. Panel data partially deals with omitted variable bias, however we use fixed 
effects in the period dimension, which raises endogeneity concerns. Measurement error 
may be the greatest threat to our inferences since it is extremely difficult to determine total 
accruals. We use an extensive sample of 1.882 companies and 13.174 firm-year 
observations, which mitigates measurement error to a certain extent. Nonetheless, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity in our model.  
4.1.2 Stock return regressions 
The same tests are run on all stock return regressions. We discuss the results of stock return 
regression with 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 in this section. The test results for the remaining two regressions 
are presented in Appendix S - Appendix Z and Appendix AA - Appendix HH, respectively. 
Normality 
The 𝑋2 statistic from the Jarque-Bera normality test was obtained (Appendix M) and it 
yielded a p value of 0,00, which provides evidence that the H0 is rejected. In other words, the 
residuals are not normally distributed. However, we argued before that due to our sample 
size this problem is mitigated.  
Autocorrelation 
Results and Analysis 41 
 
The Durbin-Watson test statistic is 2.27, which is, similarly to the previous case, close to 2. 
Hence, we conclude that the residuals are not auto correlated. The result is presented in 
Appendix K. 
Multicollinearity 
In this case, correlations between the variables vary from -0,14 to 0,05 (Appendix N). Thus, 
we conclude that there is no multicollinearity in the data.  
Heteroscedasticity 
We detect heteroscedasticity in the data by looking at the residuals graph exhibited in 
Appendix O. To mitigate this problem, we choose to use the robust standard errors again 
(Brooks, 2008). The regression with robust standard errors is presented in Appendix P. 
Heterogeneity 
The results suggest random effects in cross sectional dimension (Appendix Q). The Hausman 
test couldn’t be run in period dimension due to lack of observations. Therefore, we decide to 
use fixed effects in the period dimension, because according to (Wooldridge, 2012), even if 
the test was run and the result suggests not to reject the H0 hypothesis of random effects, 
we could still use the fixed effects since in practice when H0  is not rejected they are so close 
to each other, so it doesn’t matter which one is used. 
Since the data set that we are dealing with is a balanced panel, running the effects in both 
dimensions at the same time is plausible (Appendix R). 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity arises in our stock return regression model as well. Similarly to our 
discretionary accrual model, simultaneity does not seem to be present. The explanatory 
variables are not codetermined with stock return, but rather determine stock return. 
Omitted variables may drive our results. The number of variables used to determine stock 
returns grows with time. It is possible that there are still some variables that are left out and 
thus are included in the error term. Our panel data estimation technique mitigates omitted 
variables to a certain degree and we included other control variables to the Fama French 5 
factor model too, nevertheless we cannot rule omitted variable bias out. Measurement error 
is not mitigated so well in panel data and some of our variables are proxies that may not be 
measured accurately. 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 is such a variable. If discretionary accruals are mismeasured 
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the correlation between them and pre-managed earnings is also biased. We measure 
investments as the growth in assets, which may be misleading depending on the industry 
concerned. Certain industries grow faster in assets whereas others invest substantially in 
research and development for instance but increase their assets only if R&D activities are 
successful. Profitability is approximated by ROA, which does not take off balance sheet items 
into account. For instance, if a company has operating leases or expenses R&D assets are 
substantially lower than for other companies, thus ROA is higher. This effect is by and large 
compensated by lower net income as lease expenses and R&D costs decrease net income, so 
the numerator of ROA. The other problem that arises with ROA is capital structure. 
Companies even in the same industry may vary significantly with respect to capital structure. 
Those companies that assume debt deduct interest expenses from earnings, whereby their 
net income is smaller compared to companies that are financed fully by equity. However, 
capital structure does not determine profitability. All in all, ROA is not a perfect measure of 
profitability and the measurement error deriving from it may drive our results. We cannot be 
certain that our models do not have endogeneity bias, but we partially deal with that by 
using panel data.  
4.2 Regression results 
Our regression results are presented first for the discretionary accruals estimation and then 
for the stock return estimations.  
4.2.1 Discretionary accruals regression 
First, we estimated total accruals as part of the discretionary accrual approximation process. 
The equation has a strong explanatory power as the adjusted R2 is 72%. The results suggest 
that the nondiscretionary component of sales ((1+k)*ΔSales – ΔAccounts receivable) 
increases the amount of total accruals in line with expectations. ROA gives a raise to total 
accruals as well. It has the highest coefficient of 0.89. Cash flow from operations decreases 
total accruals, which is not surprising as whenever cash transactions are made accruals are 
cleared. The dummy for economic gain and loss predicts total accruals negatively, which is in 
accordance with our expectation since firms recognize unfavorable events in a more timely 
fashion. The magnitude of gain and loss has a very small negative coefficient. It suggests that 
when companies experience loss periods the impact on total accruals is slightly negative. The 
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rest of the explanatory variables have not been found significantly different from 0, thus we 
do not draw conclusions based on them.  
Table 2 – Results from discretionary accruals regression 
 
The fitted values from this regression are the nondiscretionary accruals, which we 
subtracted from total accruals to arrive at discretionary accruals. Then, the difference 
between earnings and discretionary accruals were taken to obtain pre-managed earnings. 
The correlation between pre-managed earnings and discretionary accruals was computed to 
attain the measure of income smoothing.  
4.2.2 Stock return regressions 
Our regression results are exhibited in Tables 3, 4 and 5. The control variables yielded very 
similar results in all three equations therefore we present their effect jointly.  
The equations all yielded an adjusted R2 around 38.4% According to our results market 
capitalization does not impact stock returns, which is inconsistent with Fama and French 
(1992) who suggest that smaller companies tend to have higher stock returns. Our results 
support Dijk (2011) who posits that size does not explain stock returns. Gross Profit/Total 
Assets boosts stock return in accordance with our expectation. Assets growth affects stock 
Dependent Variable Total Accruals
Explanatory variables Coefficient Expected sign t-Statistic Probability
1/Total Assets 0,0260 (+)/(-) 0,9905 0,3220
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts 
receivable 0,0213 (+) 1,9423 0.0521*
PPE 0,0003 (+) 0,0946 0,9247
Total Accrualst-1 0,0334 (+) 1,2005 0,2300
Growth in Sales 0,0010 (+) 1,0747 0,2825
ROA 0,8887 (+) 12,4996 0.0000***
Cash Flow from Operations -0,5726 (-) -4,5205 0.0000***
Dummy for economic gain 
or loss -0,0627 (-) -2,4689 0.0136**
Magnitude of gain and loss 0,0000 (-) -1,8867 0.0592*
C 0,0122 (+)/(-) 0,7695 0,4416
R-squared 0,7157     Mean dependent var -0,0796
Adjusted R-squared 0,7154     S.D. dependent var 0,2194
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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returns negatively as investors negatively react to empire building. Earnings yield increases 
stock return, which is not surprising as earnings yield is a profitability measure. The industry 
dummy suggests that there is tangible difference between industries. Finally, all of our 
variables of interest predict that the more firms engage in income smoothing the higher the 
stock return is. The remaining variables (Book to Market Ratio and Beta) have not been 
found significant in our data set, therefore we refrain from drawing any further conclusions 
about them.  
Table 3 - Results from stock return regression with 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴 
 
𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 yields a slightly stronger coefficient than 𝜌𝑃𝑀𝐸, 𝐷𝐴, which is the result of the 
different measurement technique, but both measures suggest that income smoothing does 
create value.  
Dependent variable Stock return
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Expected sign t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 (-) 6,8365 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0063 (+) -0,6562 0,5117
Beta 0,0036 (+) 0,4137 0,6791
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0904 (+) 5,1846 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0788 (-) -3,8488 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1312 (+) 6,4716 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0039 (+)/(-) 2,0456 0.0408**
ρ(PME,DA) -0,0434 (-) -5,2967 0.0000***
C -0,0629 (+)/(-) -3,1810 0.0015***
R-squared 0,3835     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3829     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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Table 4 - Results from stock return regression with 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐹𝑂 
 
Alongside the previous two income smoothing measures, 𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂 postulates that 
income smoothing increases stock returns even if the coefficient is smaller than it was for 
the other measures.  
Table 5 - Results from stock return regression wit 𝜎𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝜎𝐶𝐹𝑂   
 
Dependent variable Stock return
Explanatory Variables Coefficient Expected sign t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 (-) 6,6549 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0075 (+) -0,7724 0,4399
Beta 0,0038 (+) 0,4452 0,6562
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,1125 (+) 6,3733 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0792 (-) -3,8384 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1295 (+) 6,4282 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0025 (+)/(-) 1,3097 0,1903
ρ(TACC,CFO) -0,0829 (-) -7,9319 0.0000***
C -0,1051 (+)/(-) -4,8970 0.0000***
R-squared 0,3863     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3856     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
Dependent variable Stock return
Explanatory variable Coefficient Expected sign t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 (-) 6,6644 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0078 (+) -0,8099 0,4180
Beta 0,0037 (+) 0,4305 0,6669
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0966 (+) 5,5269 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0805 (-) -3,9062 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1289 (+) 6,3399 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0031 (+)/(-) 1,6747 0.0940*
σearnings/σCFO -0,0214 (-) -5,4339 0.0000***
C -0,0312 (+)/(-) -1,6090 0,1077
R-squared 0,3853     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3846     S,D, dependent var 0,5689
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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4.3 Analysis  
Income smoothing can affect firm value through three different channels i) agency cost ii) 
information asymmetry and iii) externalities. Our results examined the combined impact of 
these channels and showed that accrual-based income smoothing increases firm value. 
According to the pre-SOX research of Rountree et al. (2008) accrual-based income 
smoothing decreases firm value, but lower cash flow volatility increases it. This means that 
business decisions that lower cash flow volatility increase firm value, while accrual-based 
income smoothing actually decreases firm value. This finding is especially surprising for two 
reasons. First, Cohen et al. (2008) find that in the pre-SOX period firms were highly engaged 
in managing earnings via accruals. This suggests that managers intentionally managed 
earnings most probably to follow their own interest instead of shareholders’ interest. 
Second, if income smoothing was value creating through reducing cash flow volatility it 
induces managers to use real income smoothing instead of accrual-based. The problem with 
real income smoothing is that it destroys value via operations many times (Gunny K. , 2005). 
Managers even acknowledge that they would engage in value destructive real income 
smoothing to meet earnings targets in the survey research of Graham et al. (2005), which 
was conducted three years after SOX. Our results show on the contrary that accrual-based 
income smoothing does create value using ρPME, DA as our primary income smoothing 
measure. Our results are robust to other income smoothing measures such as ρTACC, CFO and 
σearnings/σCFO that were applied by Rountree et al. (2008). Further, we controlled for the 
2008 financial crisis with a dummy variable. The coefficient of the dummy variable has not 
been found significantly different from zero, nevertheless we cannot rule out the possibility 
that our results are influenced by the crisis. We found two possible explanations why our 
results differ from the results of Rountree et al.  
i. One of the key differences that can explain the contradictory conclusions is the 
change in legal environment. Due to ground shaking accounting scandals (such as 
Enron) US administration introduced SOX, which tremendously changed income 
smoothing and accounting practice. SOX punishes accounting manipulation much 
harsher than previous legislation. SOX induced much higher scrutiny on financial 
reporting to reduce the possibility of managerial opportunism and made corporate 
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executives directly responsible for the financials presented in their report. Therefore, 
a possible explanation is that managers rather refrain from accounting tricks and only 
use accrual-based income smoothing when their motivation is unquestionable. Our 
results suggest that SOX has been an effective tool to prevent managers’ from 
engaging in opportunistic accounting manipulations. SOX seem to have changed 
investors’ perception about accrual-based income smoothing. They also appear to 
have regained their trust in financial reports most probably due to strong internal 
and external monitoring introduced by SOX. Hence, our results encourage managers 
to use accrual-based income smoothing instead of a potentially value detrimental 
real income smoothing actions.  
ii. Yang & Zhu (2014) conclude that market uncertainty is a major factor that 
determines how income smoothing impacts firm value. Income smoothing creates 
value when market uncertainty, measured by VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Market Volatility Index), is low, but destroys value when it is high. The scope of 
Rountree et al. is 1988-2002 under which market uncertainty was substantially 
higher than during our research period (2006-2012) based on the average VIX (Yahoo 
Finance, 2015). Thus, another explanation why our results contradict Rountree et 
al.’s may be that income smoothing was value detrimental during their research 
period whereas our results reflect lower market uncertainty and that is the reason 
why we find a positive relation between income smoothing and firm value. This 
paper triggers the question whether market uncertainty truly determines the effect 
of income smoothing or not. If yes, managers are to use accrual-based income 
smoothing when market uncertainty is low, but should refrain from it if market 
uncertainty is high.  
4.4 Limitations 
A limitation of this paper is related to the sample selection. Namely, we have included all US 
companies that are available in the S&P Capital IQ database. The first limitation is that 
companies not included in the S&P Capital IQ database have been disregarded. Another 
limitation related to sample size is the exclusion of companies that have missing 
observations, which reduces the sample size. It also creates a form of survivorship bias since 
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companies that stopped operating or went private at some point in this interval are 
excluded.  
Researchers assume that the unexplained part of total accruals is discretionary accruals and 
the measure of earnings management. We assume in our discretionary accruals estimation 
that firms did not manage earnings violating GAAP, even though such events took place in 
the past and presumably will happen again. Nevertheless, we believe that the number of 
such events is negligible and therefore will not drive our results. Further, Vladu & Pelinescu 
(2014) points out that the unexplained part could be driven by poor earnings quality, 
macroeconomic factors or inefficient management instead as well.  
Our two other measures do not directly measure the effect of income smoothing. They may 
capture variations that have nothing to do with managers’ discretion on accounting figures. 
In addition, our inferences may suffer from measurement error bias, which can well be the 
greatest problem of earnings management research in general. Both measuring 
discretionary accruals and income smoothing can potentially be a result of measurement 
error, which would explain why studies in this field arrive at different inferences. Vladu & 
Pelinescu (2014) continues to argue that many papers use industry classification, whereby 
they disregard differences between companies in the same industry. Above all, the primary 
problem with industry classification when the constant coefficient is used as a benchmark. 
This can easily lead to biases when companies extensively vary from one another.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether income smoothing creates or destroys value for 
shareholders in the post-SOX period. Income smoothing can affect firm value through 
different channels such as agency cost, information asymmetry and tax reduction. We 
examine how all these potential channels together impact stock returns. Due to accounting 
scandals at the beginning of the 20th century US administration put SOX into effect to 
preclude accounting fraud and wrongdoing. We assume that this legislation change resulted 
in a fundamentally different legal environment, in which managers may use their discretion 
over accounting choice much more carefully lest violating the law. We compare our results 
with pre-SOX research and attempt to explain what role SOX might have played in the 
perception of income smoothing.  
We find that all three of our income smoothing measures (ρPME, DA, ρTACC, CFO, σearnings/
σCFO) indicate that income smoothing boosts stock returns. We control for the 2008 financial 
crisis that could potentially drive our results, but the crisis dummy variable is not found 
significant. The pre-SOX research of Rountree et al. (2008) arrives at the opposite conclusion 
concerning accrual-based income smoothing. They posit that accrual-based income 
smoothing is in fact value detrimental. We provide two possible explanations for that. First, 
SOX could have changed managers’ behavior towards accounting discretion. We argue that 
SOX has been such a radical change in regulation that managers reconsidered their approach 
towards financial reporting especially due to the much harsher consequences of accounting 
crime. As a result of SOX investors regained their trust in financial reports and do not expect 
managers to act opportunistically. This finding encourages managers to replace real income 
smoothing practices with accrual-based income smoothing since real income smoothing is 
often value destructive (Gunny K. , 2005). Second, Yang & Zhu (2014) find that income 
smoothing creates value as long as market uncertainty is low. But under increased 
uncertainty income smoothing is perceived a way to garble information and thus decreases 
shareholders’ wealth. According to this possible explanation managers ought not to use 
accrual-based income smoothing when market uncertainty is high, but they preferable use 
accrual-based income smoothing when market uncertainty is low. 
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Discretionary accruals regression variables - Descriptive statistics 
 
 1/Total Assets
(1+k) Δsales-
Δaccounts 
receivable
PPE Total Accrualst-1 Growth in Sales ROA
Cash Flow from 
Operations
Dummy for 
economic gain or 
loss
Magnitude of 
gain and loss
 Mean 0,03 0,04 0,25 -0,08 0,10 0,01 0,07 0,85 593,42
 Median 0,00 0,05 0,17 -0,05 0,06 0,04 0,09 1,00 55,20
 Maximum 34,48 7,70 0,98 14,58 88,43 5,01 6,15 1,00 59725,00
 Minimum 0,00 -9,84 0,00 -25,23 -71,09 -9,78 -11,27 0,00 0,00
 Std, Dev, 0,33 0,34 0,23 0,43 1,26 0,29 0,22 0,36 2589,49
 Skewness 86,27 -4,15 1,15 -26,71 15,54 -8,19 -9,95 -1,96 11,60
 Kurtosis 8725,00 152,56 3,35 1564,53 2893,73 212,30 595,48 4,84 180,19
 Jarque-Bera 41800000000 12316236 2991 1340000000 4590000000 24192468 193000000 10304 17529427
 Probability 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
 Sum 367,40 582,99 3312,26 -998,33 1371,66 67,94 968,00 11198,00 7817700,00
 Sum Sq, Dev, 1462,95 1558,31 715,86 2488,43 20880,17 1098,09 665,87 1679,62 88300000000,00
 Observations 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174
 Appendix B. Pooled discretionary accruals regression 
 
Appendix C. Pooled discretionary accruals regression - Normality test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error
t-Statistic Probability
1/Total Assets 0,0247 0,0032 7,8506 0.0000***
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts receivable 0,0219 0,0030 7,1991 0.0000***
PPE 0,0007 0,0045 0,1648 0,8691
Total Accrualst-1 0,0347 0,0025 14,1265 0.0000***
Growth in Sales 0,0010 0,0008 1,2314 0,2182
ROA 0,8903 0,0050 176,8659 0.0000***
Cash Flow from Operations -0,5824 0,0069 -84,5712 0.0000***
Dummy for economic gain or loss -0,0607 0,0034 -17,9568 0.0000***
Magnitude of gain and loss 0,0000 0,0000 -0,9146 0,3604
C 0,0111 0,0030 3,7499 0.0002***
R-squared 0,7185 Mean dependent var -0,0796
Adjusted R-squared 0,7183 S,D, dependent var 0,2228
S,E, of regression 0,1183 Akaike info criterion -1,4312
Sum squared resid 184,0903 Schwarz criterion -1,4255
Log likelihood 9437,1740 Hannan-Quinn criter, -1,4293
F-statistic 3732,7960 Durbin-Watson stat 1,8922
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2012
Observations 13174
Mean       7.63e-17
Median   0.008298
Maximum  3.036509
Minimum -4.515577
Std. Dev.   0.118215
Skewness  -11.52399
Kurtosis   518.0233
Jarque-Bera  1.46e+08
Probability  0.000000
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2012
Observations 13174
Mean       7.63e- 7
Median  0.008298
Maximum  3.036509
Minimum -4.515577
Std. Dev.   0.118215
Skewness  -11.52399
Kurtosis   518.0233
Jarque-Bera  1.46e+08
Probability  0.000000
 Appendix D. Discretionary accruals regression variables - Correlation matrix 
 
Variable
1/Total 
Assets
(1+k) Δsales-
Δaccounts 
receivable
PPE
Total 
Accrualst-1
Growth in 
Sales
ROA 
Cash Flow 
from 
Operations
Dummy 
for 
economic 
gain or loss
Magnitude of 
gain and loss
1/Total Assets 1
----- 
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts receivable 0,0217 1
0,0127 ----- 
PPE -0,0431 -0,0149 1
0,0000 0,0883 ----- 
Total Accrualst-1 -0,0566 0,0449 -0,0045 1
0,0000 0,0000 0,6075 ----- 
Growth in Sales 0,0094 0,1318 0,0060 -0,0003 1
0,2830 0,0000 0,4940 0,9768 ----- 
ROA -0,1785 0,1101 0,0585 0,1449 0,0171 1
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0498 ----- 
Cash Flow from Operations -0,1223 0,0811 0,1058 0,2469 0,0016 0,6932 1
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,8575 0,0000 ----- 
Dummy for economic gain or loss -0,0994 0,0773 0,1961 0,0802 0,0054 0,3921 0,4887 1
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,5366 0,0000 0,0000 ----- 
Magnitude of gain and loss -0,0191 0,0072 0,0810 0,0096 -0,0026 0,0608 0,0684 0,0963 1
0,0288 0,4091 0,0000 0,2707 0,7694 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 ----- 
 Appendix E. Pooled discretionary accruals regression - Residual graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F. Pooled discretionary accruals regression - Robust standard errors 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient
Standard 
Error t-Statistic Probability
1/Total Assets 0,0247 0,0251 0,9874 0,3235
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts receivable 0,0219 0,0106 2,0725 0.0382**
PPE 0,0007 0,0035 0,2124 0,8318
Total Accrualst-1 0,0347 0,0286 1,2134 0,2250
Growth in Sales 0,0010 0,0010 1,0662 0,2864
ROA 0,8903 0,0705 12,6235 0.0000***
Cash Flow from Operations -0,5824 0,1259 -4,6276 0.0000***
Dummy for economic gain or loss -0,0607 0,0253 -2,3961 0.0166**
Magnitude of gain and loss 0,0000 0,0000 -1,8032 0.0714*
C 0,0111 0,0158 0,7051 0,4808
R-squared 0,7185 Mean dependent var -0,0796
Adjusted R-squared 0,7183 S,D, dependent var 0,2228
S,E, of regression 0,1183 Akaike info criterion -1,4312
Sum squared resid 184,0903 Schwarz criterion -1,4255
Log likelihood 9437,1740 Hannan-Quinn criter, -1,4293
F-statistic 3732,7960 Durbin-Watson stat 1,8922
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2500 5000 7500 10000 12500
SCALE_TACC_T Residuals
Appendices 1 
 
Appendix G. Discretionary accruals regression - Cross-section and period fixed effects 
 
Appendix H. Discretionary accruals regression - Redundant fixed effect 
  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
1/Total Assets 0,0408 0,0393 1,0383 0,2992
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts receivable 0,0200 0,0103 1,9307 0.0535*
PPE -0,1084 0,0366 -2,9625 0.0031***
Total Accrualst-1 0,0207 0,0188 1,1044 0,2695
Growth in Sales 0,0007 0,0009 0,8114 0,4171
ROA 0,9104 0,0745 12,2243 0.0000***
Cash Flow from Operations -0,4489 0,1273 -3,5257 0.0004***
Dummy for economic gain or loss -0,0870 0,0234 -3,7237 0.0002***
Magnitude of gain and loss 0,0000 0,0000 -3,6247 0.0003***
C 0,0518 0,0151 3,4304 0.0006***
R-squared 0,7800     Mean dependent var -0,0796
Adjusted R-squared 0,7430     S.D. dependent var 0,2228
S.E. of regression 0,1129     Akaike info criterion -1,3913
Sum squared resid 143,8630     Schwarz criterion -0,3133
Log likelihood 11061,3000     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1,0313
F-statistic 21,0866     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1806
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Period fixed (dummy variables)
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Probability
Cross-section F 1,6622 -1881,1128 0,0000
Cross-section Chi-square 3223,7788 1881,0000 0,0000
Period F 3,6703 -6,1128 0,0012
Period Chi-square 25,7010 6,0000 0,0003
Cross-Section/Period F 1,6711 -1887,1128 0,0000
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 3248,2515 1887,0000 0,0000
Appendices 2 
 
Appendix I. Discretionary accruals regression - Cross-section Hausman test 
 
Appendix J. Discretionary accruals regression - Cross section random and period fixed effects 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. StatisticChi-Sq. d.f. Probability
Cross-section random 0,0000 9,0000 1,0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: robust standard errors may not be consistent with
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation.
Variable Coefficient Stdandard Error t-Statistic Probability
1/Total Assets 0,0260 0,0262 0,9905 0,3220
(1+k) Δsales-Δaccounts receivable 0,0213 0,0109 1,9423 0.0521*
PPE 0,0003 0,0036 0,0946 0,9247
Total Accrualst-1 0,0334 0,0278 1,2005 0,2300
Growth in Sales 0,0010 0,0009 1,0747 0,2825
ROA 0,8887 0,0711 12,4996 0.0000***
Cash Flow from Operations -0,5726 0,1267 -4,5205 0.0000***
Dummy for economic gain or loss -0,0627 0,0254 -2,4689 0.0136**
Magnitude of gain and loss 0,0000 0,0000 -1,8867 0.0592*
C 0,0122 0,0158 0,7695 0,4416
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 0,0144 0,0160
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Idiosyncratic random 0,1129 0,9840
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0,7157     Mean dependent var -0,0796
Adjusted R-squared 0,7154     S.D. dependent var 0,2194
S.E. of regression 0,1170     Sum squared resid 180,2504
F-statistic 2208,7810     Durbin-Watson stat 1,9142
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0,7189     Mean dependent var -0,0796
Sum squared resid 183,7824     Durbin-Watson stat 1,8833
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
 Appendix K. Stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) variables - Descriptive statistics 
 
  
Market 
Capitalization
Book to 
Market 
Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
ρ(PME,DA)
 Mean 5453,8110 0,6190 1,1477 0,3995 0,0688 -0,0900 5,1865 0,0244
 Median 624,0500 0,5067 1,1400 0,3269 0,0499 0,0459 5,0000 0,0158
 Maximum 511887,1000 98,4387 8,8500 7,3920 4,7283 11,8983 9,0000 0,9984
 Minimum 0,1030 -105,1282 -39,6000 -0,9237 -1,9627 -49,6154 1,0000 -0,9887
 Std. Dev. 21803,2700 2,0192 1,1822 0,3308 0,2683 1,1068 2,0096 0,5480
 Skewness 10,3513 2,3914 -21,5132 4,0985 1,8097 -23,5704 -0,2834 0,0315
 Kurtosis 150,5167 1419,9040 751,7845 40,9767 24,1864 842,3677 2,6116 1,8585
 Jarque-Bera 12180344 1100000000 309000000 828546 253579 388000000 259 717
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
 Sum 71848505,00 8154,25 15120,24 5263,30 906,05 -1186,05 68327,00 321,27
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6260000000000 53709 18412 1441 948 16137 53197 3955
 Observations 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174
 Appendix L. Pooled stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) 
 
Appendix M. Pooled stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Normality test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 4,9790 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0158 0,0023 -6,7642 0.0000***
Beta 0,0044 0,0040 1,0993 0,2716
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0641 0,0143 4,4831 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,2210 0,0175 -12,6002 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1565 0,0043 36,6054 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0028 0,0023 1,1862 0,2356
ρ(PME,DA) -0,0454 0,0087 -5,2327 0.0000***
C -0,0309 0,0157 -1,9644 0.0495**
R-squared 0,1183     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1178     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,5344     Akaike info criterion 1,5853
Sum squared resid 3759,3980     Schwarz criterion 1,5904
Log likelihood -10433,0900     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,5870
F-statistic 220,8612     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2726
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
0
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2012
Observations 13174
Mean      -4.70e-17
Median   0.042634
Maximum  5.846331
Minimum -4.462488
Std. Dev.   0.534216
Skewness  -0.173921
Kurtosis   8.202930
Jarque-Bera  14925.85
Probability  0.000000
 Appendix N. Pooled stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Correlation matrix 
 
 Variable
Market 
Capitalizatio
Book to 
Market Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
Market Capialization 1
----- 
Book to Market Ratio -0,0283 1
0,0011 ----- 
Beta -0,0329 0,0169 1
0,0002 0,0528 ----- 
Gross Profit/Total Assets -0,0325 -0,0758 -0,0615 1
0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 ----- 
Assets Growth 0,0310 0,0016 0,0089 -0,0576 1
0,0004 0,8560 0,3058 0,0000 ----- 
Earnings Yield 0,0331 -0,1435 -0,0255 0,0253 0,0413 1
0,0001 0,0000 0,0034 0,0036 0,0000 ----- 
Industry Dummy -0,0780 0,0106 -0,0619 -0,0216 -0,0578 0,0163 1
0,0000 0,2254 0,0000 0,0131 0,0000 0,0615 ----- 
 Appendix O. Pooled stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Residual graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix P. Pooled stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Robust standard errors 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Stdandard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 7,6869 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0158 0,0124 -1,2719 0,2034
Beta 0,0044 0,0092 0,4723 0,6367
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0641 0,0192 3,3301 0.0009***
Assets Growth -0,2210 0,0244 -9,0557 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1565 0,0261 5,9918 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0028 0,0023 1,2275 0,2196
ρ(PME,DA) -0,0454 0,0100 -4,5383 0.0000***
C -0,0309 0,0228 -1,3538 0,1758
R-squared 0,1183     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1178     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,5344     Akaike info criterion 1,5853
Sum squared resid 3759,3980     Schwarz criterion 1,5904
Log likelihood -10433,0900     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,5870
F-statistic 220,8612     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2726
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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Appendix Q. Stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Cross-section Hausman test 
 
Appendix R. Stock return regression ρ(PME,DA) - Cross-section random and period fixed 
effects 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. StatisticChi-Sq. d.f. Probability
Cross-section random 0,0000 5,0000 1,0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: robust standard errors may not be consistent with
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation.
** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 6,8365 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0063 0,0097 -0,6562 0,5117
Beta 0,0036 0,0086 0,4137 0,6791
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0904 0,0174 5,1846 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0788 0,0205 -3,8488 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1312 0,0203 6,4716 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0039 0,0019 2,0456 0.0408**
ρ(PME,DA) -0,0434 0,0082 -5,2967 0.0000***
C -0,0629 0,0198 -3,1810 0.0015***
Effects Specification
S.D. Rho  
Cross-section random 0,0000 0,0000
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Idiosyncratic random 0,4513 1,0000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3835     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3829     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,4469     Sum squared resid 2628,5580
F-statistic 584,7896     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1829
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3835     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Sum squared resid 2628,5580     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1829
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
 Appendix S. Stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) variables - Descriptive statistics 
 
  
Market 
Capitalization
Book to Market 
Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
ρ(TACC,CFO)
 Mean 5453,8110 0,6190 1,1477 0,3995 0,0688 -0,0900 5,1865 -0,4838
 Median 624,0500 0,5067 1,1400 0,3269 0,0499 0,0459 5,0000 -0,6341
 Maximum 511887,1000 98,4387 8,8500 7,3920 4,7283 11,8983 9,0000 0,9639
 Minimum 0,1030 -105,1282 -39,6000 -0,9237 -1,9627 -49,6154 1,0000 -0,9990
 Std, Dev, 21803,2700 2,0192 1,1822 0,3308 0,2683 1,1068 2,0096 0,4654
 Skewness 10,3513 2,3914 -21,5132 4,0985 1,8097 -23,5704 -0,2834 1,0004
 Kurtosis 150,5167 1419,9040 751,7845 40,9767 24,1864 842,3677 2,6116 3,0958
 Jarque-Bera 12180344 1100000000 309000000 828546 253579 388000000 259 2202
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
 Sum 71848505 8154 15120 5263 906 -1186 68327 -6374
 Sum Sq, Dev, 6260000000000 53709 18412 1441 948 16137 53197 2853
 Observations 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174
 Appendix T. Pooled stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) 
 
Appendix U. Pooled stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) - Normality test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 4,7519 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0170 0,0023 -7,2585 0.0000***
Beta 0,0046 0,0040 1,1548 0,2482
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0864 0,0143 6,0605 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,2210 0,0175 -12,6611 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1548 0,0043 36,2226 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0014 0,0023 0,5900 0,5552
ρ(TACC,CFO) -0,0822 0,0102 -8,0626 0.0000***
C -0,0729 0,0164 -4,4350 0.0000***
R-squared 0,1208     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1203     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,5336     Akaike info criterion 1,5824
Sum squared resid 3748,7070     Schwarz criterion 1,5875
Log likelihood -10414,3300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,5841
F-statistic 226,1844     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2791
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2012
Observations 13174
Mean       7.98e-17
Median   0.036524
Maximum  5.846242
Minimum -4.430304
Std. Dev.   0.533456
Skewness  -0.128666
Kurtosis   8.218207
Jarque-Bera  14983.18
Probability  0.000000
 Appendix V. Stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) variables - Correlation matrix 
 
 
Market 
Capitalization
Book to 
Market Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
Market Capitalization 1
----- 
Book to Market Ratio -0,0283 1
0,0011 ----- 
Beta -0,0329 0,0169 1
0,0002 0,0528 ----- 
Gross Profit/Total Assets -0,0325 -0,0758 -0,0615 1
0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 ----- 
Assets Growth 0,0310 0,0016 0,0089 -0,0576 1
0,0004 0,8560 0,3058 0,0000 ----- 
Earnings Yield 0,0331 -0,1435 -0,0255 0,0253 0,0413 1
0,0001 0,0000 0,0034 0,0036 0,0000 ----- 
Industry Dummy -0,0780 0,0106 -0,0619 -0,0216 -0,0578 0,0163 1
0,0000 0,2254 0,0000 0,0131 0,0000 0,0615 ----- 
 Appendix W. Pooled stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) - Residual graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix X. Pooled stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) - Robust standard errors 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Stdandard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 7,6569 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0170 0,0124 -1,3635 0,1728
Beta 0,0046 0,0093 0,4933 0,6218
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0864 0,0196 4,3994 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,2210 0,0247 -8,9463 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1548 0,0260 5,9560 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0014 0,0023 0,6111 0,5412
ρ(TACC,CFO) -0,0822 0,0125 -6,5502 0.0000***
C -0,0729 0,0250 -2,9133 0.0036***
R-squared 0,1208     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1203     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,5336     Akaike info criterion 1,5824
Sum squared resid 3748,7070     Schwarz criterion 1,5875
Log likelihood -10414,3300     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1,5841
F-statistic 226,1844     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2791
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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Appendix Y. Stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) - Cross-section Hausman test 
 
Appendix Z. Stock return regression ρ(TACC,CFO) - Cross-section random and period fixed 
effects 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Probability
Cross-section random 0,0000 5,0000 1,0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: robust standard errors may not be consistent with
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation.
** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 6,6549 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0075 0,0097 -0,7724 0,4399
Beta 0,0038 0,0086 0,4452 0,6562
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,1125 0,0176 6,3733 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0792 0,0206 -3,8384 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1295 0,0201 6,4282 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0025 0,0019 1,3097 0,1903
ρ(TACC,CFO) -0,0829 0,0104 -7,9319 0.0000***
C -0,1051 0,0215 -4,8970 0.0000***
Effects Specification
S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 0,0000 0,0000
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Idiosyncratic random 0,4513 1,0000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3863     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3856     S.D. dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,4459     Sum squared resid 2616,8660
F-statistic 591,6015     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1917
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3863     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Sum squared resid 2616,8660     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1917
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
 Appendix AA. Stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Descriptive statistics 
 
  
Market 
Capitalization
Book to Market 
Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
σearnings/σCFO
 Mean 5453,8110 0,6190 1,1477 0,3995 0,0688 -0,0900 5,1865 1,4285
 Median 624,0500 0,5067 1,1400 0,3269 0,0499 0,0459 5,0000 0,9641
 Maximum 511887,1000 98,4387 8,8500 7,3920 4,7283 11,8983 9,0000 23,2365
 Minimum 0,1030 -105,1282 -39,6000 -0,9237 -1,9627 -49,6154 1,0000 0,0610
 Std. Dev. 21803,2700 2,0192 1,1822 0,3308 0,2683 1,1068 2,0096 1,5775
 Skewness 10,3513 2,3914 -21,5132 4,0985 1,8097 -23,5704 -0,2834 4,5740
 Kurtosis 150,5167 1419,9040 751,7845 40,9767 24,1864 842,3677 2,6116 37,6433
 Jarque-Bera 12180344 1100000000 309000000 828546 253579 388000000 259 704721,4000
 Probability 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
 Sum 71848505,00 8154,25 15120,24 5263,30 906,05 -1186,05 68327,00 18818,6000
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6260000000000 53709 18412 1441 948 16137 53197 32781,7100
 Observations 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174
 Appendix BB. Pooled stock return regression σearnings/σCFO 
 
Appendix CC. Pooled stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Normality test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 4,7603 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0173 0,0023 -7,4075 0.0000***
Beta 0,0045 0,0040 1,1320 0,2576
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0706 0,0142 4,9819 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,2224 0,0175 -12,7164 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1541 0,0043 35,8929 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0020 0,0023 0,8739 0,3822
σearnings/σCFO -0,0218 0,0030 -7,2599 0.0000***
C 0,0012 0,0164 0,0755 0,9398
R-squared 0,1200     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1195     S,D, dependent var 0,5689
S.E. of regression 0,5339     Akaike info criterion 1,5833
Sum squared resid 3752,1960     Schwarz criterion 1,5885
Log likelihood -10420,4600     Hannan-Quinn criter, 1,5850
F-statistic 224,4441     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2770
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2006 2012
Observations 13174
Mean       5.94e-17
Median   0.038961
Maximum  5.852461
Minimum -4.226548
Std. Dev.   0.533704
Skewness  -0.138559
Kurtosis   8.181265
Jarque-Bera  14778.10
Probability  0.000000
 Appendix DD. Stock return regression σearnings/σCFO variables - Correlation matrix 
 
 
Market 
Capitalization
Book to 
Market Ratio
Beta
Gross 
Profit/Total 
Assets
Assets 
Growth
Earnings 
Yield
Industry 
Dummy
Market Capitalization 1
----- 
Book to Market Ratio -0,0283 1
0,0011 ----- 
Beta -0,0329 0,0169 1
0,0002 0,0528 ----- 
Gross Profit/Total Assets -0,0325 -0,0758 -0,0615 1
0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 ----- 
Assets Growth 0,0310 0,0016 0,0089 -0,0576 1
0,0004 0,8560 0,3058 0,0000 ----- 
Earnings Yield 0,0331 -0,1435 -0,0255 0,0253 0,0413 1
0,0001 0,0000 0,0034 0,0036 0,0000 ----- 
Industry Dummy -0,0780 0,0106 -0,0619 -0,0216 -0,0578 0,0163 1
0,0000 0,2254 0,0000 0,0131 0,0000 0,0615 ----- 
 Appendix EE. Pooled stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Residual graph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix FF. Pooled stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Robust standard errors 
 
  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 7,6312 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0173 0,0124 -1,3935 0,1635
Beta 0,0045 0,0093 0,4836 0,6287
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0706 0,0193 3,6530 0.0003***
Assets Growth -0,2224 0,0246 -9,0245 0.0000***
Earnings Yield 0,1541 0,0262 5,8871 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0020 0,0022 0,9067 0,3646
σearnings/σCFO -0,0218 0,0047 -4,6768 0.0000***
C 0,0012 0,0223 0,0557 0,9556
R-squared 0,1200     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,1195     S,D, dependent var 0,5689
S,E, of regression 0,5339     Akaike info criterion 1,5833
Sum squared resid 3752,1960     Schwarz criterion 1,5885
Log likelihood -10420,4600     Hannan-Quinn criter, 1,5850
F-statistic 224,4441     Durbin-Watson stat 2,2770
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
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Appendix GG. Stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Cross-section Hausman test 
 
Appendix HH. Stock return regression σearnings/σCFO - Cross-section random and period 
fixed effects 
 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. D.f. Probability
Cross-section random 0,0000 5,0000 1,0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: robust standard errors may not be consistent with
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation.
** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability
Market Capitalization 0,0000 0,0000 6,6644 0.0000***
Book to Market Ratio -0,0078 0,0097 -0,8099 0,4180
Beta 0,0037 0,0086 0,4305 0,6669
Gross Profit/Total Assets 0,0966 0,0175 5,5269 0.0000***
Assets Growth -0,0805 0,0206 -3,9062 0.0001***
Earnings Yield 0,1289 0,0203 6,3399 0.0000***
Industry Dummy 0,0031 0,0019 1,6747 0.0940*
σearnings/σCFO -0,0214 0,0039 -5,4339 0.0000***
C -0,0312 0,0194 -1,6090 0,1077
Effects Specification
S,D,  Rho  
Cross-section random 0,0000 0,0000
Period fixed (dummy variables)
Idiosyncratic random 0,4513 1,0000
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3853     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Adjusted R-squared 0,3846     S,D, dependent var 0,5689
S,E, of regression 0,4463     Sum squared resid 2621,1760
F-statistic 589,0835     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1888
Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0,3853     Mean dependent var -0,0203
Sum squared resid 2621,1760     Durbin-Watson stat 2,1888
***,**,* significance in 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively
